

TOWN AND GOWN: THE CONSORTIUM FOR PEACE
STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY 2005-
2015 AS A CASE STUDY IN ACADEMIC-COMMUNITY
PARTNERSHIPS

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This study examines the history of one attempt to establish a peace studies program at a Canadian university through the lens of social movement and organizational/institutional theory. For ten years the Consortium for Peace Studies at the University of Calgary tried to establish a peace studies program. This article discusses how the Consortium came about, the barriers it faced in achieving its goals, and the reasons for its failure. Ideological and institutional resistance, as well as a lack of long-term funding, were the main factors in the Consortium's demise. Likewise the Consortium's initial adoption of a hybrid model of an academic-community partnership in its governance resulted in both positive and negative consequences. The history of the Consortium offers valuable insight into issues that arise when an academic-community partnership acts as a change agent in a traditional academic environment.

BACKGROUND

The Consortium for Peace Studies existed at the University of Calgary (U of C) from 2005 to 2015. The history of its founding, evolution, and ultimate closure is important for the field of Peace Studies because it highlights both the successes and perils of academic-community partnerships, especially in contexts of ideological tension and institutional rigidity. This article is a combination of history, personal memoir, and case study. It is written by one

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of the founders of the Consortium, who was its inaugural co-chair and final director. Although the author is a historian by training he is not a disinterested observer of this particular history. He was an active player throughout the Consortium's creation and demise. This element of engagement has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are his direct involvement in key decision-making, organizational familiarity, and full access to archival material that is not yet public. The disadvantages are proximity to the topic and the bias inherent in discussing his own role and that of others. Total objectivity is never possible. In this study objectivity is only partially achieved. By recognizing these limitations this analysis of the Consortium can be viewed as a first step in recording a valuable history.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This study uses two theoretical approaches—specifically that of social movement theory (the town) and more generally that of organizational/institutional theory (the gown). These two approaches will help explain how an initiative that began with idealistic aspirations evolved into a practice fraught with contradictions and conflicts. Theory moves this study beyond a straightforward history of a short-lived institution by illuminating the tensions at play in the operations of a semi-autonomous entity embedded in a larger academic structure. It also helps identify the power dynamics unleashed when town meets gown, while suggesting lessons for future iterations of this kind of relationship.

Social movement theory seeks to explain the phenomenon of social mobilization, its forms and impacts on society and politics. Because the Consortium had its roots in social protest over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it took a part of its identity from social and political activism. According to Bob Edwards and John McCarthy the success of a social movement may be gauged by its ability to attract money and physical capital; build solidarity and support for its goals; institute organizational strategies, social networks, and recruitment; find volunteers, staff, and leaders; and make use of prior activist experience with practical knowledge of how to mobilize.¹ Their template provides a useful analytical framework for assessing the practical strengths and weaknesses of the Consortium as a social movement.

There is also a broader framework for comprehending the Consortium's

trajectory based in other social movement theories. These theories explain the appearance of social movements through the concepts of deprivation, opportunity for resource mobilization, political conditions, and ideological framing.² This set of ideas allows us to analyze the origins of the Consortium in terms of why the founders felt it was needed, how they viewed the resources available to them, why the "political" situation was open to this initiative, and the ideological elements that they used to frame its founding.

Generally, social movement theories deal with much wider sociopolitical phenomena than the establishment of an academic institute. They involve popular uprisings, social change protests on a society-wide basis, and movements that involve multiple organizations, stakeholders, and actors. However, this does not mean that the concepts derived from a study of these wider phenomena are essentially different when analyzing the founding of the Consortium or its evolution. Jacquelin van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermus summarize various social movement theories to show that a social change initiative grows out of alienation, frustration, and marginalization that then finds expression through a well-organized and resourceful group that is not afraid of building coalitions between challengers and elites through the articulation of a common identity.³

Furthermore, social movement theory itself has undergone extensive self-reflection and self-criticism in the 2000s, which has led it to move away from macro structural paradigms toward the micro level. James Jasper has pointed out that "the intellectual pendulum has swung away from the great structural and historical paradigms and back toward creativity and agency, culture and meaning, emotion and morality."⁴ This pendulum swing impacts this study by encouraging an enhanced view of individual agency, creative initiatives, and ethical issues.

Social movement theory is only one theoretical base for this study. The other is organizational/institutional theory. This is a broad field involving private, public, and social sectors. Since the Consortium was situated in a publically funded university, it exhibited features typical of semi-autonomous academic entities within a larger institutional framework. The university framework normally combines public sector bureaucratic attitudes and political direction with an educational tradition of collegiality and academic freedom. So any application of organizational theory to the story of the Consortium must be fine-tuned to reflect this specific situation.

In contemporary institutional theory there are several relevant

concepts. The first is that of *institutional forces* in particular their “cultural and discursive dimensions.”⁵ In the case of the Consortium we will need to assess what kind of institutional power it projected and which institutional forces within the university challenged and restrained it. The second concept is that of a change organization, which is how the Consortium both saw itself and sold itself to both the broader community and to the university community. Change organizations see themselves as innovators or originators whose disruptive power is meant to modify the status quo. However, even as they see themselves in a radical or revolutionary way, they tend to use traditional models of organization.⁶ The kind of organizational model that the Consortium adopted in terms of governance had an impact on its identity and its acceptance by the wider academic community. The third applicable concept is that of actors and agency. In every organizational structure there are players and stakeholders who guard their institutional power against interlopers. This is applicable to the Consortium both internally and externally. The struggle over authority led to problematic power relations that quickly shaped the Consortium’s discourse about itself and put limits on its activities.

The Consortium also had to develop a unifying ideology that legitimized its operations and goals among diverse social groups and communities. How that ideology integrated with a wider university discourse was a major factor in the Consortium’s long-term survival. That ideology had to balance academic legitimacy with community activism. The need for legitimization shaped the Consortium’s goals, practices, and leadership style within a standard university model, while, on the other hand, the need for community support and profile influenced those same factors in a community activist direction. What we will see is how the Consortium used what Manuel Hensmans calls “the logic of difference” in order to position itself as a valued entity both within academe and in the community.⁷ This discourse allowed it to utilize both its academic and community actors.

Agency within the Consortium was simultaneously diffuse and concentrated because of its hybrid governance model. Sustaining a joint community-academic profile eventually led to deep cracks in the organization as it sought to maintain an functional base in the non-academic community, while conforming to the standards and discourse of a larger and more powerful institution—the university in which it was embedded. The organizational hybridity that characterized the Consortium was not foreseen

nor was it planned at the start. It came about as a result of its founders having to adapt to the challenges of institutionalization in a conservative environment.

A TIME OF HOPE: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CONSORTIUM, 2004-2008

Thousands of Calgarians marched against the impending invasion of Iraq in 2003. It was a significant display of opposition in a city known for its conservative, pro-corporate, and American orientation. The marchers were just a very small part of the millions in cities around the world who expressed outrage at a blatant act of aggression.⁸ This public galvanization served as the political and emotional context for the founding of the Consortium for Peace Studies. That is why the Consortium can be considered the product of a social movement. It involved a group of people from the community and the academy that came together with a mission to respond to the war.

In response to the invasion and as an acknowledgement of Canada’s refusal to participate, George Melnyk, an assistant professor in the Faculty of Communication and Culture at the University of Calgary, edited a protest volume titled *Canada and the New American Empire: War and Anti-War* that was published in 2004 by the University of Calgary Press. The key feature of the collection was its combination of academic and community contributors. Among the contributors were George Melnyk, Arthur Clark, a professor of Medical Pathology, and Bill Phipps, former Moderator of the United Church of Canada. They became key players in the founding of the Consortium.

Melnyk convened a meeting of the contributors who lived in Calgary in February 2004 and proposed the establishment of a Peace Studies institute at the University of Calgary. They and others that joined the group agreed with this goal. They called themselves the Ad Hoc Committee to establish a Peace Centre at the University of Calgary and Melnyk served as its chair. It had 18 members. Kathleen Scherf, the Dean of the Faculty of Communication and Culture, met with the committee and asked it to submit a request to proceed with a proposal for the establishment of a Canadian Centre for Peace and Human Security (CCPHS) within the Faculty of Communication and Culture. The request stated that the Alberta did not have a peace institute at any of its universities and that the Centre would

engage in the scholarly study of national and international peace building, human security, and civil society's role in the prevention of violence and the transformation of conflict. The proposal reflected two key theoretical social movement concepts—that of *deprivation* or a void that needed filling and that of an opportunity for resource mobilization. The opportunity came from the Faculty's earlier offering of Peace Studies courses that it no longer taught and the Faculty's reputation for being open to progressive ideas, multi-disciplinarity, and educational innovation. The peace institute idea fit those categories. Without this context of support the proposal would never have been made.

On the financial front the request stated the Centre would be self-funding with a base annual income of \$30,000. The mechanism envisaged for this level of funding was that of individual donors who would be asked to provide guarantees over five years to achieve this minimum. Further income would come in the form of research grants, publication grants, and special projects funding. This funding model was a departure from the norm in which a new institute would have an endowment to assure its fiscal stability over time. This funding model, while novel, seemed feasible on paper. However, it had an element of uncertainty and insecurity. It lacked the assured funding necessary for a successful social movement. This ad hoc funding model was necessary because Calgary's corporate culture and Alberta's political culture at the time was unreceptive to such a proposal. In contrast, the former leader of the right-wing Reform Party and an Albertan, Preston Manning, along with some friends were reported as having "raised an initial \$10 million from wealthy Albertans to launch a new non-political institution designed to promote conservative ideas in Canada."⁹ If finding funding in a right-wing province to establish a peace institute was a challenge, it was also a challenge to be accepted by the wider University of Calgary community.

An example of a well-funded and high profile institute already at the University was The Centre for Military and Strategic Studies led by prominent right-wing academics. When the Centre heard about the proposal, it objected to the use of the term "human security" in the proposed name. It claimed that human security was exclusively within its purview, and that another entity's use of the term could be construed as a duplication of "courses, activities, research programs, etc. that are already well-established."¹⁰ Since the Director of CMSS was a powerful figure on campus (a former Dean of

Graduate Studies), the Ad Hoc Committee decided it was best not to fight back.¹¹ The Vice-President of Research had the final word on the proposal and he suggested a compromise. Instead of authorizing a peace studies institute under the name that the committee had proposed (The Canadian Centre for Peace and Human Security), the VP Research allowed the use of the term "consortium" on the condition the name did not include the term human security.

The founding document of the newly renamed Consortium for Peace Studies was created at a day-long retreat attended by members of the community and the university. The resulting structure was an anomaly for academic institutions since it emulated the structure of a community-based, non-profit society in which the members elect a board and approve a program and budget. This democratic structure was not an easy fit with the hierarchical management structure of universities. The hybrid model had two co-chairs, an executive committee, and a voting membership. The first two co-chairs were Maureen Wilson from the Faculty of Social Work and George Melnyk from the Faculty of Communication and Culture. Their respective deans were supportive and played important roles in the Consortium's development.

Membership of the Consortium consisted of thirteen academics from ten different faculties at the university, and eight community members. There were also three academic advisors from other universities and four partner community organizations. In total there were almost thirty people involved. Since there was no Peace Studies program at the university academic participation may have been guided more by political ideals and ideological leanings than by individual research activities and interests. Arthur Clark provided \$15,000 in seed money in December 2004 and the following year he matched other donations to the Consortium, which raised a further \$11,000.¹² Clark also offered the Consortium a chance to share an office with the Dr. Irma M. Parhad Programmes, which he had established in memory of his late wife. The Parhad Programmes provided funding to students with interest in international development issues, and an annual lectureship.¹³ The office was being moved from the Faculty of Medicine to the Faculty of Social Work. As well as an office, the Parhad Programmes would be hiring a paid staff person, who would be allowed to work half-time on Consortium programs. In one fell swoop the Consortium got funding, an office, and a staff person. The first of the five social movement pillars

(money and physical capital) were a result of his generosity. However, this generosity had the potential of creating a certain level of dependency. Even so, the fact that in its first year of operation the Consortium had raised almost its entire proposed budget (\$28,000 of \$30,000) was encouraging.

The second pillar, building solidarity and support for the movement's goals, involved the creation of specific programs that would reflect the Peace Studies mission of the Consortium. These programs would have to straddle two different faculties (a general studies one, which was its official home, and a professional one, where it had the office and staff). While this inter-faculty co-operation was welcome, it also signaled a division that could prove problematic later on. There were several lines of authority, which confused the situation and made it difficult to mobilize a focused program, or garner a distinct identity. By belonging in several places and spheres of authority it never really belonged to anyone in particular. It was encouraged, but not embraced.

The mission statement of the Consortium stated that its goal was the reduction of the human and environmental cost of violence, "through outstanding scholarship, applied research and education in peace studies" and by "fostering partnerships for a secure, healthy and creative global environment."¹⁴ This mission resolved into research partnerships and fellowships, the creation of a certificate in Peace Studies, and the ultimate goal of a Minor in Peace Studies that would be housed in the interdisciplinary programs of the Faculty of Communication and Culture

At its April 2005 meeting the committee was presented with a list of possible activities that would reflect both its needs and its goals. Among the major ones were a peace prize, an annual lecture, a visiting fellowship, a publication program, sponsorship of the International Peace Research Association 2006 conference, plus establishing a consortium of peace studies research institutes in western Canada. Certainly, this was an ambitious program for such a fragile entity.¹⁵ In May 2005 the Consortium was formally established and moved into its new office in July. Most of the year was actually spent preparing new programs to be launched in fiscal year 2006-2007 (April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2007).

Three initiatives were launched in 2006-07 that became regular features of the Consortium's program. The most important of these was the Calgary Peace Prize, which was first awarded in the fall of 2006 to Takatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima and President of Mayors for Peace, a global organization

of mayors who had made their cities nuclear-free zones. To have a figure of such stature be the first to accept the \$5000 Prize was a substantial boost. Not only did the prize raise the profile of the Consortium on campus and in the community (then Mayor of Calgary Dave Bronconnier and Harvey Wiengarten, President of the University were co-presenters), it also became the flagship fundraiser for the Consortium. An attendee at the event donated \$50,000 to be used for operations over a 5-year period. Later on, another attendee at the Peace Prize dinner, who was a longtime peace activist, was moved to make a \$25,000 donation to endow (in part) the Consortium's University of Calgary Research Fellowship in Peace Studies. In this way the community became a key source of financial support, adding to its social movement-like profile.

The first fellow that the Consortium hosted was Dr. Jim Whitman from the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, in the UK. That department has the largest peace studies program in the English-speaking world. Whitman worked on his book, *The Fundamentals of Global Governance*.¹⁶ He also spoke in the Peace Talks Series on the Geneva Conventions on War. Another program was the Peace Play Competition chaired by Dawn McCaugherty from the Faculty of Fine Arts. The competition was meant to stimulate the creation of new plays that would promote peace, social justice, and human rights by offering insight into the part played by war, violence and conflict in human history.

In its second year the Consortium was doing well financially. There was obvious support for certain events like the Peace Prize both in the community at the highest political level (the mayor) and on campus from the President and other senior figures. What was striking for such a fledgling entity was the Consortium's international focus. Peace activist Mayor Akiba of Japan, peace researcher Jim Whitman from the UK and the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) bi-annual conference in the summer of 2006 were prestige builders. Inviting the IPRA conference to the university was the brainchild of Larry Fisk, Professor Emeritus, Mount Saint Vincent University, who had retired to Calgary, and was a member of the founding CCPHS committee. Fisk was the coordinator for IPRA's bi-annual conference scheduled for June 2006. The conference connected the Consortium to the wider community of peace researchers globally. All of this gave the Consortium substance and legitimacy from the start, but it did not move it specifically in the direction of an undergraduate program in

Peace Studies, which was one of its prime goals.

At the January 22, 2007, general membership meeting attended by 16 members (three of whom were community members) the Consortium voted to strike a “Peace Studies Committee” of three academics to work on developing a Bachelor of Peace Studies degree by preparing a list of courses that could be included in the degree program. The long-term viability of the Consortium and a key rationale for its existence depended on the establishment of such a program. The process turned out to be long drawn and ultimately unsuccessful.

The organizational strategy of the Consortium was based on three principles: combining volunteer time with paid work, utilizing university resources to the maximum possible, and matching offerings to financial resources. These strategic principles were in turn based on several operational principles, such as ensuring the support of powerful figures on campus (deans and above) and maximizing social networks. Volunteer time was primarily that of the membership, who served on committees, such as the ones that selected the Calgary Peace Prize recipient, reviewed the fellowship applications, or worked on fundraising.

The requirement for social networking applied to both the academy and the community. In seeking the support of influential bodies on campus, which is a form of social networking, the Consortium invited members of the University Senate to attend a February 2006 meeting. The Chancellor, William Warren, wrote a thank you to the Consortium for hosting this “Dialogue with the Senate.” “The senate members in attendance,” he wrote, “expressed an interest in following up with the Consortium in a few years to see the progress you have made.”¹⁷ But not all attempts at networking were successful. For example, as early as 2005 there was a suggestion made to set up an undergraduate student club called “Students for Peace.” This never happened. One reason for this was the lack of courses or programs in Peace Studies through which interested students could be identified. On the community side networking was more limited because partner organizations, such as Project Ploughshares Calgary and the Parhad Programmes were already on side. One of the regrettable failures was the establishment of a constructive relationship between the Consortium and the various Rotary groups in the Calgary area. Rotary had a peace orientation internationally, but in spite of strenuous efforts a bridge could not be built. This failure was a warning that the reach of the Consortium was limited to small, local peace

activist organizations and that major organizations were not interested in partnering with it, especially in the building stage.

An important requirement of a successful social movement—the recruitment of volunteers and leaders—was something the Consortium excelled at initially. The co-chairs held their position for three years, giving the Consortium a stable and experienced leadership, while the Consortium itself mobilized its membership to offer committee-level support to its various projects. Whenever the Consortium needed something from the community there was a wealth of experience that it could tap. And in some cases the academic members themselves had an activist background. So in terms of the five requirements of a successful social movement identified by Edwards and McCarthy, only a stable financial base was missing. But even this last factor was not fundamental in the first few years because ad hoc and multi-year support (via the Parhad Programmes) was in place. After two years of operation (May 2005 to April 2007) the Consortium was established and had a profile on campus.

In 2007 there was an interesting development regarding the Calgary Peace Prize. The first prize had been given in the fall of 2006 and so the fundraising committee had planned the same time frame for the following year. The committee approached His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan and re-scheduled the prize for the spring of 2008. The Prince, who had just completed his term as Moderator of the World Conference of Religions for Peace, had served as President of the Club of Rome and co-chaired the United Nations Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. The Prince agreed, which meant that we had another eminent international figure be a recipient, but he did not attend in person because of a diplomatic snafu.

The Conservative government of Stephen Harper would not treat the Prince as a head-of-state, which meant that the Prince and his entourage had to go through the same security screening as everyone else. The Prince was unhappy with this situation and so we had to make alternate arrangements. The dinner was held on March 31, 2008 with 200 guests attending. The Lieutenant-Governor of Alberta, Mr. Norman Kwong, and the Chancellor of the University, Joanne Cuthbertson, jointly presented the prize to his designee. Then the Prince delivered his acceptance speech via teleconference. A month later Chancellor Cuthbertson and co-chair Melnyk travelled to Amman, Jordan to present the prize in person. The Chancellor also took

advantage of the visit to present the Prince with an Honorary Degree.

The work of the Peace Studies committee progressed slowly. Mandated to explore the teaching of peace studies on campus, the committee was eventually able to recommend that the Consortium move to establish a postgraduate certificate (one year) or diploma (two years) by “packaging existing courses on campus.”¹⁸ Even this seemingly modest goal was more difficult to achieve than anyone expected.

Going forward into fiscal year 2007 (April 1, 2007, to March 31, 2008) the Consortium showed a positive balance of \$20,000, to which it added \$47,000 in revenue, which included a surplus of \$10,000 from the Calgary Peace Prize dinner. There was the secure 5-year funding of \$10,000 per annum from the \$50,000 anonymous donation made at the 2006 peace prize dinner and the Parhad Programmes agreed in 2008 to continue paying the salary and benefits of the half-time program manager for a further five years. In both 2006-07 and 2007-08, revenues exceeded expenditures. However, donations remained modest (in the thousands), which meant the prospect of a real endowment that could assure sustainable funding was diminishing. While the annual reports suggested all was fine, the underlying reality was different. The Consortium was plateauing in what it could offer. Without an endowment fund, its long-term sustainability was to prove a challenge and without a higher level of research, publication and teaching it could not fulfill its academic aspirations.

Other fissures were also forming in the organization’s base. The academic members had not developed either individually, or collectively a significant research program in peace studies. What they were doing for the most part was being supportive of the daily operations of the Consortium. It was an idea and a practice that they felt was worthwhile and which fit their progressive views. But this did not make them peace studies scholars. Likewise, progress toward a credit program in Peace Studies was plodding along. There were other clouds on the horizon as well, involving institutional changes that would bring instability and fundamental change to the Consortium.

A TIME OF FRUSTRATION: THE MIDDLE YEARS, 2008-2013

After the founding burst of energy, the social movement aspects fell away as an institutional paradigm took hold. The Consortium seemed well-established

on the surface because its programs were ongoing. The Calgary Peace Prize for 2009 was awarded to Louise Arbour, the former Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and a former Supreme Court of Canada judge. The research fellow for 2008-09 was Susan Dente Ross from Washington State University, who worked on media and freedom of expression. Financially, the Consortium continued to have an annual surplus of over \$50,000, which offered short-term security.¹⁹ While the Consortium could be characterized as a change organization in its early years, its middle age was all about maintenance. Although it added a second fellowship in honour of Dr. Arthur Clark’s contribution to the Consortium and launched a Global Peace Studies Series at Athabasca University Press, its main academic objective of a Peace Studies undergraduate degree seemed as far off as ever.

In its fifth year of operations (2009-10), the Consortium retained a healthy budgetary surplus of \$70,000, which allowed it to create the Summer Institute in Peace Studies in collaboration with the Faculty of Social Work. This was a Block Week credit course open to graduate and senior undergraduates in the Faculty of Social Work. Members of the public could audit the course. The Consortium paid the instructor’s stipend. The inaugural instructor was Dr. Jim Whitman from Bradford, who had been the Consortium’s first research fellow. His stature and expertise meant the course was full. This was the Consortium’s first real step in teaching peace studies. It was spearheaded by Maureen Wilson, who had served as co-chair, and it was managed expertly by Kelly Dowdell, the Consortium’s program manager at the time.

In the sixth year (2010-11), when the \$50,000 donation was about to run out, the first serious cracks began to appear. One came from the community side and two from the academic side. First, Arthur Clark established the Calgary Centre for Global Community (CCGC), a community-based entity. Its offices were off-campus, but more importantly, the Centre became the focus of his financial and organizational attention. Parhad and the Consortium were now legacy institutions. While CCGC and the Consortium had an official partnership, the energy and commitment that Clark had shown toward the Consortium five years earlier was now transferred to this new project. One practical example was CCGC’s hiring of the Parhad/Consortium’s energetic and strategy-oriented program manager, Kelly Dowdell, to helm its activities. With her departure the Consortium

lost a key player. While Clark was willing to continue his support (and temporarily increase it) that support was now time-limited. Discussions with him about the relationship between the Consortium and the Parhad Programmes going forward began in November 2011.²⁰ He agreed to continue funding the Consortium until the end of fiscal 2013 with the new program manager working almost full-time on Consortium business. What was to happen after that date was unknown.

When Clark moved his focus to the community side, he embraced CCGC as a change agent filled with new ideas and an activist sensibility. The governing structure of the Consortium shifted permanently to the academic side. This meant that the Consortium was working solely within the political environment of the academy. If Clark's end-date for staff funding was the first major operational barrier, then the first major academic barrier came when the university amalgamated four faculties, including the Faculty of Communication and Culture, into a new Faculty of Arts. The supportive dean from Communication and Culture left the university and the dean of Social Sciences took charge. While the Faculty of Arts listed the Consortium as part of its cohort of research centers, it was not something the newly amalgamated Faculty had any close ties to. The amalgamation meant that the establishment of any new program, either as a minor or a major, would have to go through a new, expanded, and not necessarily friendly, adjudication. The mountain had just gotten higher.

Although the Consortium worked on a proposal for an endowment, the idea never got any traction. As a result, a sense of uncertainty and homelessness began to pervade the organization. To whom did the Consortium belong? How was it going to survive? Who was going to be in charge? These were some of the questions that became preoccupations during the middle years. At the same time the Consortium's social networks within the academy and outside were thinning. The Consortium became marginalized in the structure of the new amalgamated Faculty of Arts.

In 2011 Sandra Hoenle stepped down as co-chair and George Melnyk replaced her.²¹ His co-chair was Joanne Cuthbertson, the former Chancellor of the University, who had continued her interest in and support for the Consortium. That summer the co-chairs signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Faculty of Social Work that made the Consortium "an administrative unit within the Faculty"²² for a term of three years starting on April 1, 2012, and ending on March 31, 2015. While this development

extended the life of the Consortium it was time-limited, like Clark's funding.

The Consortium entered a stage of program disequilibrium. One contribution to this disequilibrium was a proposal to end the co-chair structure and replace it with a new governance structure. A proposal that the co-chairs submitted argued that the Consortium was facing two challenges: an academic deficiency and a staff supervision imbalance. In regard to the first matter, the report pointed out that the academic membership of the Consortium had stagnated and academic involvement had decreased over time. A new and younger academic cohort was not joining the Consortium. Also, the move to the administrative umbrella of the Social Work faculty meant that non-Social Work academics might not feel comfortable joining, while Social Work faculty would not necessarily join the Consortium. On the supervisory imbalance issue, the report argued that the program manager was no longer part-time and that the co-chair structure did not lend itself to providing sufficient hours for proper supervision.

In May 2012, the Consortium approved the new organizational structure, which was radically different from the previous one. The Consortium was led by a director and a deputy director. The Executive Committee was replaced with a consultative council, whose role was advising rather than directing. There were three committees: a peace studies committee, an interdisciplinary research group in peace studies and social justice, and a fund development and community relations committee. There would be an annual meeting of the general membership to offer advice on future directions. This structure came from a traditional academic model for institutes. The previous hybrid model based on a non-profit society social sector model with power ultimately residing with the votes of the general membership was now gone, and with it any links to social movement models. The academic-community partnership and the activist element were gone. Melnyk became the director and Wilson the deputy director. Lawyer Doug Perras chaired the fundraising committee as he had in the early years and Sandra Hoenle, a former co-chair, became chair of the Peace Studies Committee, whose task was to develop a diploma, certificate, or minor in Peace Studies.

On paper the new structure seemed focused and solid, with the Director reporting to the Dean of Social Work, but it was a major departure from past practice and had unforeseen consequences. For one thing, the Director was not a member of the Social Work Faculty. The community members

were relegated to a purely supportive role (fundraising and volunteer) and the full-time Program Manager, whose orientation and background had been toward mobilizing the community, was no longer a good fit because of the redirection to academe. While the projected budget for 2012-13 showed a hefty revenue of almost \$200,000, a third was the salary of the program manager, whose position was eliminated in the spring of 2013. The projected funds going forward into 2013-14 were the lowest balance forward the Consortium had ever had.²³

Meanwhile the regular program of the Consortium, including its two fellowships, its play competition, summer institute course, and peace prize dinner continued. The Interdisciplinary Peace Research Group was still working on a suitable program, including the provision of seed grants for peace research projects on campus. And the proposal to the Faculty of Arts to have a Minor in Peace Studies was slowly winding its way through various committees. At the same time the proposal for a certificate in peace studies and social justice was still being considered by the Faculty of Social Work. When neither the Faculty of Arts nor the Faculty of Social Work was amenable to the proposals, the *raison d'être* of the Consortium was undermined.

THE END, 2013-2015

It would have been hard to imagine when the new governance structure began in 2012 how quickly the end would come. The hybrid model of an academic-community partnership had sustained the Consortium for eight years, but its replacement, the new academic model, proved untenable. There was simply insufficient support in the university community. The failure to achieve either an undergraduate minor or a postgraduate certificate was indicative of the new reality. In the 2013-14 fiscal year, the first without a full-time manager, the Consortium had a part-time assistant in place for only three months. At the same time the director prepared a tentative budget for 2013-14 in which he concluded:

According to this projected budget we can expect \$7,000 (balance forward) plus \$35,000 (fundraising) for 2014-15, which is 40% of our requirements, based on expenditures of \$90,000. We would have the funds to pay for an admin assistant

and the Director's course releases if we didn't get any further funding. There would be no funds for programs [fellowships, etc.] unless the University contributes approximately \$50,000.²⁴

It was a stark warning that the Consortium could not carry on in the way it had beyond the current year. Clearly, the situation was terminal. There was no funding from the university; the decade-long effort to create some sort of viable peace studies program at the university had come to naught; the community had been sidelined; and the academic-centric Consortium was now unable to fund even its previous modest academic programs such as the fellowships. There was also another, even more serious factor that complicated the situation. This was the pending retirement of its major academic players (the director and deputy director) without a new cohort or generation of academics to take their place. A financial crisis, failure to achieve original goals, and now the pending retirement of key stakeholders meant three strikes. The Consortium was out.

TRANSITION AND RENEWAL, 2015

With the future of the Consortium at the University of Calgary in serious doubt, a search began to find a new home. Fortunately, the Faculty of Arts at the newly minted Mount Royal University (MRU), formerly Mount Royal College, expressed an interest. In 2014 its Dean of Arts, Jeff Keshen, entered into negotiations with the Dean of Social Work, Jackie Sieppert, to transition the Consortium from U of C to MRU. In the spring of 2015, MRU agreed to a new arrangement in which the Consortium as such would no longer exist, but that MRU would establish a peace and violence studies initiative under Dr. Mark Ayyash and also pursue the establishment of a minor in Peace and Violence Studies at MRU. MRU promised to keep the annual Calgary Peace Prize going. After the transition had been made, MRU in collaboration with Dr. Clark's Calgary Centre for Global Community sponsored its first Calgary Peace Prize event with Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire as the 2015 recipient.

In 2017 MRU announced the John de Chastelain Peace Studies Initiative, named after an MRU alumnus and retired general.²⁵ At the same time it announced that Peace and Conflict Studies was available as a minor in the Faculty of Arts. What could not be achieved at the U of C had taken

only a short time to do at this new university. The Consortium had found a foster home for itself.

WHERE THEORY MEETS PRACTICE

Did the Consortium make a fatal mistake in moving toward a totally academic governance? Was this move the one that led to the end of its tenure? On the surface this seemed to be the case, but on closer examination the flaws in the hybrid model were more probable factors. The first factor in the Consortium's demise was its failure to achieve its original vision as a full-bodied, respected institute that was fully integrated into the life of a faculty and the university. It was never fully embraced wholeheartedly by either of the two faculties that it dealt with at the end—Social Work and Arts. The opportunity for resource mobilization that existed in the beginning gradually evaporated. Likewise, the Consortium's inability to launch a credit program at the certificate, diploma, or minor level was a serious failure. Without any academic credit program the Consortium lacked a full (i.e. long-term) integration into the university structure. Because of this the Consortium failed to be the change organization that it sought to be.

The hybrid model had been adopted as an interim measure in order to initiate the process of becoming a fully legitimized, traditional academic structure. The academic-community partnership provided seed funding and then ongoing limited-term funding but it could never replace the fiscal stability of an endowment. The initial proposal for the establishment of the Consortium had foreseen a five-year interim form of non-endowment funding in order to buy time to establish secure funding. The requirement of sufficient and stable funding was not met. The hybrid model offered only an interim form of funding and it gave the community a significant presence at the start. This presence could not have continued indefinitely because the university structure would not allow community control over an institute through a non-profit society / social sector voting structure.

Social movement theory suggests that organizational success calls for viable organizational strategies, social networks, and recruitment. In its last two years the Consortium no longer fit into the social movement model and its academic-only strategy lacked the academic network support to push through initiatives. Academics are attracted to research funding, which

institutes need to provide. The lack of an endowment and the termination of majority funding meant that the Consortium was unable to support research and when this was added to its lack of a teaching function, the Consortium's academic irrelevance became obvious. In spite of the Consortium having generated over a half-million dollars in revenue over its lifetime, this was not enough to produce a significant presence on campus.

The Consortium viewed itself as a progressive force ideologically, but this ideological orientation was not the dominant one at the University of Calgary. The discourse around the Consortium worked best within the small peace community and individual academic supporters, but it did not work well in the wider institution or society. In spite of some decanal support, the Consortium could not find an enthusiastic acceptance within the broader membership of those faculties and their specific disciplinary orientation. The prevailing discourse in the new Faculty of Arts after 2010 against the validity of inter-disciplinarity, which was Peace Studies' identity, was a blow from which the Consortium could not recover. The Consortium faced either opposition or indifference from institutional forces whose cultural and discursive dimensions were not its own.

Institutional theory is the final evaluator of what happened because the context for the formation and demise of the Consortium was the University of Calgary, its rules, its structures, and its orientation. All institutions have a life-cycle that demands renewal if they are to survive. Such renewals require keeping the mainstream legacy of the institution (its institutional identity and reputation) intact, while adding modifications and reforms that contemporize its presence and its impact. The Consortium was never able to synchronize its identity with that of the wider institution. The left-liberal ideological orientation of a peace studies program was not an easy fit with the established and prevailing identity of the university. Although the Consortium found initial shelter in two left-liberal faculties—Communication and Culture and Social Work, the political capital that individual deans were willing to apply to supporting the goals of the Consortium was limited. It was always an uphill struggle.

The record of the Consortium was not shabby. Its numerous fellows, one of whom was from the University of Oxford, came from a variety of countries and used the Consortium to further their academic careers. Its publication program of peace studies titles, while not extensive, did offer a wider dissemination of knowledge in the field. Fifty plus peace talks over the

years brought both scholarly and informed discussion to engaged audiences on campus. The summer institute course attracted international and national academics to teach University of Calgary students. Of course, the Calgary Peace Prize brought renowned figures to address citizens and students alike. (The list of notable recipients is provided as an appendix to this article.) While failing to achieve its major goals, the Consortium was able to succeed on more modest fronts. It did not achieve its major goal until the transfer to Mount Royal University with the pre-condition of establishing a Peace Studies minor there.

So what are the successes and perils of academic-community partnerships? The Consortium's social movement/community aspects—community support for its goals, networking, volunteer recruitment, broadly-based leadership, and initial funding—were key to its launch and initial establishment within the university. The community saw a need, valued the initiative, offered financial support, and stood by the Consortium as it developed its various programs. It saw the Consortium as a change agent. Whatever small successes the Consortium had were dependent in large part on that support. But there were also serious drawbacks in the partnership.

The main drawback was fiscal dependency. Without an endowment the Consortium depended on annual cash flow and the generosity of individual donors. For years the Consortium was supported by community funding of its staff and its programs (Dr. Clark and the anonymous donor). Its own fundraising efforts generated only a minority of the funds it used. When the majority of its funding came to an end, the Consortium became unsustainable. A lesser peril, but a real one all the same, was having a nonprofit society voting structure serve as the ultimate authority in determining the programs and direction of a university institution. Because the majority of the voting members were academics, this was not a serious peril. Of a more serious nature is the matter of actors and agency in the history of the Consortium. Both social movement and institutional theories refer to the importance of an engaged and visionary leadership. The Consortium was fortunate to have a stable group of academic leaders that were there at the beginning and stayed with it over the years. So when that leadership (Clark, Melnyk, Wilson) retired the Consortium was without a cohort with historical memory and in-depth knowledge of the organization. The failing of this cohort was its inability to find successors, which, however, pushed it

to find an alternative leadership in another academic institution.

This case study is not meant to throw a negative light on academic-community partnerships. Its purpose is to record the successes of such a partnership while raising issues that can and did arise when organizational hybridity met institutional inertia. These partnerships display an inherent struggle for control resulting in the rise of a dominant partner and a junior one. Since the Consortium was based in a university the dominant partner was the academic one. However the exercise of that dominance proved ineffective because of its relative powerlessness within the academy. In fact the Consortium was dependent on the community support of the hybrid model/partnership. When that support ended so did the Consortium.

What confirms this analysis is the rebirth at Mount Royal University. MRU termed the program the "John de Chastelain Peace Studies Initiative." The Peace Initiative sponsors the Calgary Peace Prize and administers the Minor in Peace and Conflict Studies.²⁶ So it has a public face via the prize and an educational face via the minor, but its governance is totally within the academy. Its website's description of the Minor is a solid synopsis of what the Consortium hoped to achieve at the University of Calgary.²⁷ Although it lost the battle at the University of Calgary, the Consortium won the war by negotiating the first Peace Studies program at another academic institution, thereby giving Alberta its first Peace Studies program. It filled the void it had identified in 2005 but in a way it never foresaw.

APPENDIX: RECIPIENTS OF THE CALGARY PEACE PRIZE

Tadatoshi Akiba (Mayor of Hiroshima)	2006
Prince El Hassan bin Talal (Diplomat)	2008
Louise Arbour (Jurist)	2009
Sally Armstrong (Feminist Activist)	2010
Vandana Shiva (Environmental Activist)	2011
Izzeldin Abuelaish (Peace Advocate)	2012
Emmanuel Jal (Former Child Soldier)	2013
Samantha Nutt (Founder of War Child Canada)	2014

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