INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, PEACEBUILDING, AND SECURITY: ANALYZING DATA AND TRENDS

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The increasing concentration of poverty, insecurity, and humanitarian response in so-called fragile and conflict-affected states has led to the coming together of the development and conflict/peace/security agendas. Official development assistance (ODA) has become increasingly "securitized"—used to support interventions aimed at conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, and security system reform—according to some research of the international assistance of northern donor countries, including Canada. This study compares and analyzes three data sources on the allocation of Canadian international assistance for the twelve years from 2007–08 to 2018–19, and finds that the data given in the annual Statistical Report on International Assistance provides more complete data on disbursement amounts to the conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, and security sector (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] sector code 152) than either the Historical Project Data Set or the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database. A multi-year dataset created from this source shows that aid disbursements have not significantly increased to the conflict, peacebuilding, and security sector over these twelve years, nor have aid disbursements to related (but "softer") sectors of government and civil society capacity-building. This dataset does show the effect of the merger of the Canadian International Development Agency with Canada's Foreign/Global Affairs department in governmental sources of assistance to this sector. The analysis also shows the increasing open inclusion of Canada's

> non-ODA assistance to this sector in the two Canadian data sources, consistent with greater whole-of-government integration of development assistance priorities with conflict, peacebuilding, and security agendas.

Conflict, peace, security, and international development assistance have become increasingly interrelated in complex and contested ways since the end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11. The interventions of development assistance programs and projects are now expected to more actively support governance change in "fragile" recipient countries, via conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, and security enhancement. While development assistance is still formally intended to promote economic and social development, these goals are increasingly seen as interrelated with overcoming state fragility and supporting good governance, and thereby promoting international security. The security-development "nexus" has also been extended to emergency humanitarian assistance, as the majority of international humanitarian responses are now related to crises of hunger and displacement created by protracted conflicts, and so also needs to give careful attention to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.[1]

Thus the purposes for which international development assistance is used have broadened, and scholars of the international assistance system have attempted to analyze how aid flows and allocations have changed in response. This article seeks to contribute to this literature, by analyzing trends in Canadian international (development) assistance data for evidence of these changes.

Scholarship on the "nexus" between conflict, peace, security, and development has become increasingly cross- and inter-disciplinary, moving across previously more isolated fields of security studies and international relations, international development studies, and the newer fields of peace and conflict resolution studies.[2] This represents a challenge for scholars, often still accustomed to working out of their home specialty, to broaden their understandings to the concerns, approaches, and perspectives of other fields.[3] This article, in presenting research rooted in the analytical concerns of development studies in a journal focused on peace research, thus also intends to increase interdisciplinary understanding of how official development financing for peacebuilding has changed in recent years.

From the field of international development studies, the increasing attention to issues of conflict resolution, security, and peacebuilding has raised concerns about the "securitization" of development assistance[4] and the adoption of "whole-of-government" approaches in its planning and delivery.[5]

Securitization, as related to development assistance, sees "underdeveloped" countries as a major source of global insecurity and "terror," and so reframes the officially normative and neutral humanitarian field of development (i.e. assistance based solely on the basis of recipients' humanity and need) in terms of global security. This makes development assistance serve as a form of soft power to serve the national and geopolitical security interests of Western donor countries.[6] Programmatically, securitization is evident in a number of ways: in the geographical re-allocation of development assistance finance to conflict-affected countries and regions (i.e. fragile states); in the shift of interventions to the "harder" subsectors within conflict resolution and peacebuilding sectors (such as the reform of security-sector and justice institutions); concomitantly in a shift away from aid to other priorities such as poverty reduction or gender equality, due to relatively static aid budgets; in the increasing involvement of other donor government departments (such as defence departments and police agencies) in the delivery of assistance; and in conditionalities placed on that assistance.[7]

Similarly, in contexts of conflict in fragile states, whole-of-government approaches aim for the greater "coherence" of development assistance policy with donor security, defence, and diplomacy goals.[8] Whole-of-government approaches are most evident in the use of other non-aid government departments (such as national police and security forces) to deliver international assistance,[9] and in the integration of previously separate (if not wholly independent) international assistance agencies within ministries of foreign affairs in a number of donors countries, resulting in concern that development funds are used more closely to support broader donor foreign policy objectives, not the poverty reduction development goals of recipient countries.

Canadian development assistance has also been critiqued in terms of both securitization and whole-of-government organizational changes. Studies by Stephen Brown, Stephen Baranyi and associates, and Liam Swiss have all examined the evidence for the increasing allocation of development assistance for supporting the conflict resolution, peace, and security intervention sectors.[10] A stronger whole-of-government approach was also evident in the

close linking of greatly expanded Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) programming with the Department of National Defence presence in Afghanistan, and the channelling of assistance, particularly for police and judicial sector reform, through the Royal Canadian Mounted Policy (RCMP) in Iraq and Haiti. This integration culminated in the merger of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2013. The focus of these studies was the period of major Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Haiti. The studies by Brown and Swiss only use data to 2013 and 2008, respectively,[11] and there have been no studies that analyze the overall longer-term quantitative trends in Canadian international assistance to the peace and security sectors to the current period, either in terms of how the changing array of government departments have been used to deliver assistance, and how the amounts and sectoral composition of funding has changed over the past decade.

Methods used in studies of intervention practice frequently consider the amount of official funding for development programs in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, and security as the measure of levels of commitment and engagement in this sector. Such analysis requires, in part, consistent data on aid financial volumes, donor-government departmental sources, aid delivery channels, allocation among aid sectors, and coding of purposes and goals of each project intervention. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (hereafter OECD-DAC) has, since the 1960s, been the custodian of the core concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the global standard measure of the financial resources provided as development assistance.[12] The core normative standard of ODA has been that it must be "administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare" of the recipient country as its main objective.[13] This definition specifically excludes assistance provided for military and security purposes, or commercial and trade purposes, which is simply called "official assistance." Another important aspect of the standard-setting of the OECD-DAC has been the development of defined sector and purpose codes, which all donors use to classify all their development assistance disbursement according to their intended purposes. Included in the OECD-DAC sector and purpose codes, and commonly used as a key metric for international assistance for conflict, peace, and security (and thus of specific interest for this article), is the Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peacebuilding, and Security

(hereafter "CPRPS") sector code (sector codes 152), one of sixteen major DAC5 sector codes defined by the OECD for ODA classification purposes. Yet there is also considerable debate on what security-related interventions can or should be counted as ODA and, as will be discussed further below, some CPRPS purpose codes have been expanded and some donors have continued to push for greater inclusion of security-related expenditures.[14]

The extensive annual statistical reports on ODA sectoral allocation required by the OECD-DAC from member countries are important because analysis of this standardized data ensures transparency, comparability, and accountability for the policies and programs of development assistance donors. This imposes "an analytical rigour to dialogue among donor governments," ensuring they are using the same terminology and categories when comparing and debating aid policies.[15] The OECD-DAC data are thus routinely used by development analysts and scholars to investigate and to support comparative studies in their scholarship.[16] Yet the compiled and standardized nature of the OECD databases, which, for example, exclude assistance delivered through multilateral channels, make them limited for detailed examination of the aid programs of any individual donor country, and most major donors also publish detailed national reports on their development assistance, which can be used to assess national international assistance priorities and policy initiatives. Yet these national reports and datasets can be partial, use different standards than the OECD-DAC, and change over time. The Canadian government annually publishes a Statistical Report of International Assistance, but it reports on the broader category of "international assistance" and uses additional programming sectors to report and classify its aid funding. It also annual posts on its website a downloadable Historical Project Dataset of all aid disbursements, yet until recently this dataset excluded Canadian assistance provided through multilateral channels, only including bilateral aid expenditures. Thus it is difficult to determine exact longer-term historical trends in aid sources, disbursement amounts, and absolute and relative sectoral allocation.

This study seeks to contribute to the assessment of changes in the allocation of Canadian international assistance to the conflict, peace, and security sectors by analyzing three specific questions:

- Which of the three available data sources, in terms of analytical methods, provide the most complete and accurate data on aid

amounts to CPRPS?

- Do changes in both the overall amount and composition of aid disbursements to CPRPS support claims of the continued securitization of Canadian development assistance?

- What are the impacts of the adoption of a whole-of-government approach, in terms of shifts in the delivery of assistance in the CPRPS sector associated with organizational changes in the Canadian aid bureaucracy and in statistical reporting of international assistance?

The remainder of the article is organized as follows: First, the previous studies of how the peace, security, and development nexus has impacted Canadian international assistance, particularly in terms of securitization, will be reviewed. Second, the three data sources examined in the study, and the methods used to analyze their comparative completeness and usefulness in analyzing aid to the CPRPS sector, will be described. Third, trends in the sectoral allocation and departmental sources of Canadian assistance will be analyzed to assess whether evidence of securitization can be observed in trends in aid flow amounts and sectoral allocations, and linked to the recent reorganization of Canadian international assistance agencies. A short discussion of the conclusions, strengths, and gaps of this study will conclude the article.

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, PEACEBUILDING, AND SECURITY

In Canada, as elsewhere, security and development assistance policies were historically "conceived as distinct spheres of activity."[17] Canadian international assistance in the areas of security and conflict were administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) and not the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), even when some of this assistance was eligible (and counted) as part of Canada's official development assistance (see below). Beginning in the 2000s, responding to increasingly complex and interrelated security/development crises in so-called failed states such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, Canada was a leader in adopting a "whole-of-government" approach, which linked defense, diplomacy, and development instruments in responding in these countries.[18] This was

reflected in Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement, which included "a broad focus on development cooperation as the first line of defence for collective security,"[19] the establishment of Global Peace and Security Fund within DFAIT (and not CIDA) with an annual budget of $100m, and the ranking of Afghanistan and Iraq as the top recipients of Canadian development assistance during most of the first decade of the 2000s. By 2013, the pressures for achieving this "whole-of-government" coherence in Canadian foreign policy was one of the rationales for the merger of CIDA into the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), since renamed Global Affairs Canada (GAC).[20] Significant debate occurred at that time as to whether this greater coherence between development and Canadian diplomatic, commercial, and security concerns would lead to greater development effectiveness or the subsuming of development principles for narrower national self-interest.[21] The announcement of Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) in 2017 adopted a primary focus on Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5—achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls—but also included peace and security as one of five additional priority "action areas" for Canadian international assistance.[22] In the words of a recent report to Parliament on Canadian international assistance, the FIAP "adopts an integrated approach to development, humanitarian, and peace and security assistance through six action areas."[23]

As introduced above, these changes in Canadian international assistance have been critiqued in past studies. Brown has written extensively on the relationship of Canadian development assistance to other foreign policy goals, arguing that development priorities have increasingly been integrated with and subsumed by security and commercial priorities.[24] In a comprehensive overview of the trends, causes, and impacts of the securitization of Canadian foreign policies from 2000 to 2013, Brown notes that despite the adoption of a "whole-of-government" approach, each of the foreign affairs, defence, and development departments interpreted the threat of "failed and fragile" states differently.[25] In analyzing the securitization of Canadian assistance to Afghanistan, he argues that it was largely driven by specific but temporary foreign policy dynamics related to Canada's standing in the international community. Similar factors influenced policy on assistance to Iraq and Haiti. In the final years of this period, he argues, Canadian assistance became *de*securitized, and instead became more aligned with Canadian commercial interests.[26] Baranyi has examined Canadian engagement in fragile

states, both in the specific case of Haiti and (with Anca Paducel and with Themrise Khan) more broadly, concluding that the level and effectiveness of securitization and development success varied significantly.[27] For example, in Afghanistan development assistance was tightly integrated with the dominant North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military strategy, while in Haiti assistance focused more on state-strengthening and longer term development, "in line with international aid effectiveness principles."[28] Swiss argues there is evidence for the securitization of aid during the first decade of the 2000s, given that four conflict-affected countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, and Sudan) had become the top ten recipients of Canadian development assistance, and that aid was increased to the conflict, peace, and security sector. He proposes that this is evidence that securitization has "increasingly instrumentalized" Canadian aid to support Canadian foreign policy and security goals at the expense of less self-interested development goals such as gender equality.[29] Thus, though there is evidence of the increased securitization of Canadian international assistance, particularly during the first decade of the 2000s, as Swiss summarizes, this was "a quiet and implicit" process that occurred "in an ad hoc manner responding to larger Canadian foreign policy interests … in the absence of an overall institutional policy,"[30] and it is not clear whether securitization has continued as a clear Canadian international assistance policy priority since these studies were published in the early and mid 2010s.

DATA SOURCES ON CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

There are three possible sources for quantitative data on Canadian aid flows: the annual Statistical Report on International Assistance (SR-IA), published by the Government of Canada;[31] the Historic Project Data Set[32] (HPDS), published online annually by Global Affairs Canada (and its predecessors);[33] and OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (OECD CRS) online dataset. Each has particular constraints for use in the analysis of aid flows to conflict, security, and peacebuilding.

The Statistical Report on International Assistance is issued in partial compliance with the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act.[34] It provides a series of pre-set tables on international assistance by government department source, purpose or sector, recipient country, and delivery

channel. It is noteworthy that all these reports, since 2007–08, have used the broader term "international assistance" in their title, switching from the OECD standard of "official development assistance" used previously, and thus since 2007–08 include some assistance that does not qualify as "developmental," per OECD definitions. Its opening pages have a detailed explanation, with a supporting graphic, on how international assistance (IA) differs from ODA, as it includes some (but not all) Canadian international military and security assistance and includes assistance to several countries not on the OECD-DAC list of (low and middle income) ODA-eligible recipient countries. The difference is not large, in the range of $200m most years, and reflects the technical/definitional difficulty, as well as the government's policy reluctance, to separate the close relationship between developmental and security assistance. Though relatively small within the entire international assistance budget, these amounts are significant when analyzing trends in the specific ODA sector of CPRPS (purpose code 152, as will be reported below). The Statistical Reports provide the most expansive data on Canadian international assistance, as they are the only reports that include multilateral assistance, which can be an important source and channel of assistance to conflict, peace, and security. Thus they are particularly interesting for this study, because they also provide data on assistance on the "edge" of the conflict, peace, security, and development nexus, and they break down this assistance by government source (including the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)—relevant for analyzing the 'whole-of-government' policy), and by purpose codes.

The second relatively comprehensive data source for Canadian development assistance is the Historical Project Data Set (HPDS). The HPDS is provided annually in spreadsheet format, providing detailed information on aid disbursements in a given fiscal year, with dozens of description fields for each disbursement, giving information such as the program/project title, originating government department and branch, type of aid, recipient organization type and name, recipient country, purpose and sector codes (in percentages, if a disbursement is allocated across multiple sectors), and various policy markers. These annual datasets are very large (often with over 30,000 rows and 35+ columns of data) and need to be analyzed in database or spreadsheet programs, and so require considerable specialized knowledge to extract desired information (such as year to year comparisons and trend

analysis.) More importantly, until 2014–15 (after CIDA merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), the HPDS only included aid disbursements from CIDA, but not funding provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies such as the RCMP, and so excluded many project disbursements in the CPRRS sector (the sector where Foreign Affairs assistance was particularly concentrated). It also did not include other official (non-ODA) assistance (some of which was also concentrated in the conflict and security sectors), and thus using the HPDS underreports total aid flows. Starting in 2016–17, the HPDS has included expanded data, and provides identical information to that in the tables of the Statistical Report. Thus the HPDS, while potentially containing a great deal of detailed analytical information, is limited for analyzing historical trends (extending prior to 2016–17), in addition to being difficult to work with.

The OECD-DAC is the third source data source for Canadian (and all OECD-DAC member country) international development assistance financial flows. The OECD publishes two online query-able databases that provide aid allocations by sector: the DAC5 table and the Creditor Report- ing System (CRS). The CRS data is more detailed, as it is aggregated from individual donor "activities" (grants, programs, projects), is disaggregated by recipient country, and is based on actual disbursements (and not just com- mitments, which sometimes are not fulfilled). However, the CRS dataset has several limitations. It (and the DAC5 dataset) do not include donor multilateral ODA provided as (core) program funding to multilateral orga- nizations.[35] It is also not easy to use when studying Canadian aid patterns, since OECD-DAC data is reported on a calendar (i.e. January to December) basis, rather than the federal Canada government's April to March fiscal year. The OECD-DAC also converts all donor development assistance from domestic currencies into United States dollars ($US), and so is subject to currency fluctuations over time. In addition, since the CRS database is built on reporting of project-level assistance activities, it requires that individual projects ('activities') only be assigned one purpose code, corresponding to its main purpose.[36] Due to the integrated and cross-sectoral nature of many projects, Canada (and other donors) often assign multiple purpose codes to individual projects that have multiple, interrelated purposes, allocating a proportional percentage of project funding to each purpose sector. The OECD-DAC CRS database also does not report the sources of assistance

within donor bureaucracies or divisions with donor agencies.

As introduced above, all these data sources use the OECD sector and purpose codes to classify the amounts of assistance that supports conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security programming. Within the main Conflict Resolution and Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Security 152 sector code, there are six more specific five-digit purpose codes: 15210 for security system management and reform; 15220 for civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and resolution; 15230 for participation in international peacekeeping operations; 15240 for reintegration and control of small arms and light weapons; 15250 for land mine clearance; and 15261 for child soldiers (preventions and demobilization). To ensure consistent use of these purpose codes, the OECD-DAC publishes detailed descriptions of the activities that can appropriately be included under each purpose code.[37] It is notable that these descriptions in the 152xx purpose codes tend to be quite lengthy, longer than the average description, and that the OECD has also published separate guides and casebooks to clarify what peace and security activities may be counted as ODA.[38] These OECD guides, for example, expressly prohibit using ODA to support training or equipment for militaries, require that ODA only support civilian-supplied non-coercive assistance for preventing counter-terrorism and violent extremism, and only allow 15% (increased in 2016 from 7%) of donor contributions to peacekeeping operations (and then only United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations) to be counted as ODA.[39] These detailed and evolving standards indicate the difficulty of clarifying and conceptualizing the relationship of peace and security interventions to development objectives. Yet the six subsectors listed above implicitly define what are considered as legitimate "developmental" interventions for CPRPS, and when researchers analyze donors' prioritization of CPRPS and trends in securitization, the aid amounts allocated to the 152 sector purpose codes are usually used as the best proxy for this commitment. [40]

While these standard statistics from the OECD-DAC may constrain studies of securitization, questions about what actually constitute peace, security, and well-being, and how these can be produced or supported by external interventions, is also widely debated, particularly in the fields of conflict and peace studies.[41] For example, Melita Lazell and Ivica Petrikova, in a study of donor aid commitments to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, divided interventions into two broad categories. They label the first category

"democratization"—the encouragement of democratic, inclusive societies that respect human rights, through programs that strengthen civil society and the rule of law, and that reduce economic marginalization and social exclusion. The second they label "conflict, peace, and security aid"—the prevention and resolution of conflict, through programs that reform the security sectors (i.e. police, justice, and prisons), support small arms control, and support civilian peace-building activities.[42] These two categories broadly correspond with the concepts of positive and negative peace, which are foundational in conflict and peace studies.

Since conflict prevention, peace, and security are closely related to governance and democracy, international development assistance to Government and Civil Society (OECD sector code 151) could also be considered as assistance for peace and security. Within this sector, specific purpose codes include more general public-sector capacity-building goals such as public-sector policy and administrative management, and public finance management, as well as purpose codes more closely aligned to peace and security, including legal and judicial development, democratic participation and civil society, elections, media and free flow of information, human rights, and women's rights organizations and movements (see data table in Annex 1 for a complete list). These purpose codes correspond quite well with the broader, "building democratic and peaceful societies" approach discussed above. Given this definitional concern, comparative trends in the allocation of Canadian assistance to the government and civil society purpose codes will also be analyzed below.

COMPARING DATA SOURCES FOR TRENDS IN AID AMOUNTS

In order to be able to compare the three data sources from Canada and the OECD-DAC, each had to be manipulated to allow accurate and comparable analysis. From the annual Statistical Report on International Assistance, Table B1 (starting in 2007–08, when multilateral assistance began to be included) was converted from pdf to xlsx spreadsheet format, using an online converter. Since the pdf tables were presented in the SR-3wIA with inconsistent lines and formats, each converted file was carefully checked against the printed table and corrected as necessary.[43] Each annual table was then unpivoted,[44] and the tables for all years merged into a single

spreadsheet table. This allowed the SR-IA data for the entire twelve year period to be summed by total international assistance, total ODA (with non-ODA disbursement subtracted), and by assistance to each sector code, and by each purpose code within the 151 CPRPS and 152 Government and Civil Society codes, using the pivot-table function of the spreadsheet program. The annual HPDS datasets were merged into a single spreadsheet, to allow tabulation of yearly total ODA, and total by sector. For the OECD CRS query-able database, a table was generated, with aid amounts selected as disbursements and as current $US.[45] In order to make the OECD CRS data given in $US comparable to the Canadian SR-IA and HPDS data in Canadian dollars ($CDN), the data was converted to current $CDN using the annual exchange rates provided by the OECD.[46]

Summary data from each was then copied into a single table, in order to compare and graph the amounts and trends reported by these three data sources. The calendar year OECD data was entered under the Canadian fiscal year in which there was greater overlap.[47] The comparative trends in total Canadian international assistance and/or official development assistance is presented in Figure 1, and total assistance to the OECD-DAC purpose code 152 Conflict Resolution, Peacebuilding, and Security are presented in Figure 2.

Figure 1. Total Canadian International Assistance and ODA - Comparing Data Sources and Trends

These figures show that there are significant differences in the totals reported by each data source. For total Canadian international assistance (Figure 1), the Statistical Report shows the highest amounts, with total international assistance slightly higher than ODA. The HPDS reports significantly lower total ODA until the final three years of the dataset, since up to that time it only reported disbursements from CIDA/DFATD/GAC, and not other federal departments or provincial contributions. Over the nine years the HPDS did not include disbursement from other government departments, it only reported 65% of the total disbursements included in the SR-IA. The OECD-DAC data also reports significantly lower amounts of Canadian ODA than the SR-IA. The OECD-DAC reported amounts, in general, are lower than the Canadian SR-IA because they only include donor bilateral ODA, and not donor contributions to the regular budgets of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the regional development banks, and some UN and other agencies.[48] The lower totals for Canadian ODA in the OECD CRS database correspond very closely to the total bilateral assistance disbursements (i.e. excluding multilateral disbursements) reported in the SR-IA ODA (data not shown).

The differences between data sources are even more significant for the totals and trends for assistance specifically to CPRPS (Figure 2). The SR-IA again reports the largest amounts of assistance to CRPBS. Two trend lines are again displayed for the SR-IA data, one with only assistance to those purpose codes (15200 to 15260) that are on the OECD-DAC list of ODA sectors, and one with assistance to CPRRS sector codes 152 that includes new additional purpose codes (numbered 152 but not agreed by the OECD-DAC) that GAC began using in 2016. Thus the second higher trend line only appears for the final three years of the SR-IA data in Figure 2.[49] The significance of this will be discussed further below.

Figure 2. Canadian International Assistance flows to Conflict, Peace and Security (OECD-DAC Purpose Code 152)

Comparing Data Sources and Trends

Even when excluding the non-ODA disbursement amounts, the SR-IA reports ODA disbursements to 152 sector codes that are significantly higher than the disbursements reported in the HPDS and OECD-DAC CRS data. The HPDS includes less than one-third of the amount of disbursements as the SA-IA for most years until 2013–14, when CIDA was merged with Foreign Affairs, and the peacebuilding and security assistance primarily delivered by Foreign Affairs started to be included in the HPDS. The OECD CRS data is quite variable, usually less than the disbursement amounts reported in the SR-IA, but equal to it several years early in the series, and less than half for several years between 2013 and 2015. The non-ODA disbursements included in the SR-IA, beginning in 2016–17, are significant amounts of assistance, averaging $195m for each of these three years, and (as can be seen in Figure 2) doubling the total amount of assistance in this enlarged list of 152 sector purpose codes.[50] These five additional purpose codes are listed in the SR-IA with a footnote, indicating they "were created for departmental use, and are not part of the OECD's purpose code list."[51] In the SR-IA reports before 2016–17, while the subtitle to Table B1 indicates it includes

both "ODA and other official assistance expenditures," it is not possible to determine how much the "other official assistance" expenditures are, or in what sector they were made.[52] The increasingly open manner in which these non-ODA expenditures are included in the SR-IA in the past three years may indicate a move to consider these security-oriented activities, related to primarily global threats, as more closely integrated within the programming of Canada's otherwise "developmental" international assistance. This would support concerns for the increasingly securitization of Canadian international assistance.

The creation of a single dataset from the merged Table B1 in the Statistical Reports also allows analysis of how departmental sources of Canadian assistance to CRPBS has changed over time and been affected by the restructuring of Canadian international development assistance organizations. Figure 3 shows the major sources of disbursements to Sector 152 for the twelve years from 2007–08 to 2018–19. During the CIDA years, the majority of assistance was provided by DFAIT. When CIDA and DFAIT merged in 2013 to form DFATD, this amount of assistance continued, mostly within the International Security and Crisis Response division with DFATD. The increase in aid amounts in the two years 2010–11 and 2011–12 corresponds with the height of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and Sudan. The sharp increase in amounts starting in 2016–17 corresponds to GAC's addition of new non-ODA purpose codes in Table B1 of the Historical Reports, as discussed above.

Figure 3. Trends and Sources of Canadian International Assistance to Conflict Resolution, Peacebuilding and Security (OECD Sector Code 152, ODA and 'official assistance')

Throughout the twelve-year period, only small amounts of assistance to CRPBS were proved through the regular development-focused country-to-country bilateral channels of CIDA (to 2013) and the successor geographic branches of DFATD/GAC. Review of the HPDS (where project-level information can be gleaned) shows that the majority of this bilateral assistance was for purpose code 15250 Land Mine Clearance. However, it is also evident is that other Canadian government departments have not had large roles in providing assistance to the CRPBS sector. The RCMP has provided consistently small amounts of assistance throughout the period, but it has not increased its roles as would be predicted by the securitization thesis and the adoption of a whole-of-government approach. The Department of National Defense did not provide significant amounts, which were so small that they were grouped within the remnant Others in Figure 3. The other notable recent trend, since 2016–17, is significant amounts of GAC multilateral assistance to UN agencies, which were largely contributions to UN agencies for peacekeeping operations (see below).

What is clear from Figure 2 and Figure 3 is that Canadian assistance to

conflict resolution, peace, and security, at least in the overall ODA-eligible purpose codes and countries, remained relatively stable during the twelve-year period to 2018–19. Thus there is no clear evidence of securitization of Canadian development assistance during this period, in terms of increases in aid allocations to the most direct CRPBS sectors. But it is noteworthy that the reporting on the total international assistance envelope has moved to more explicitly including assistance to related (but technically non-ODA) peace and security sectors.

TREND IN OTHER SECTORAL ALLOCATIONS

The discussion above has already identified the limitations of using the narrow metric of assistance to OECD sector code 152 to assess development assistance to CRPBS, and indicated that assistance to other sectors related to governance and civil society can also contribute to these goals.

Trends in the proportion of assistance allocated to all the major OECD-defined aid sectors are presented in Figure 4.[53] Because of the significant variability in sectoral amounts from year to year (actual year-by-year data is given in the master data table in Annex 1), best-fit trends lines (rather than actual amounts for each year), using a four-order polynomial function, are presented in the graph.[54] While it is difficult to make definitive statements about each trend observed over the twelve-year period using this method, several important trends can be suggested. Humanitarian assistance has increased the most and become the largest single sector of assistance, which corresponds with the rise of the humanitarian element of the security-development nexus. While humanitarian assistance responds to the immediate needs (for food assistance, health and sanitation, and shelter) created by conflict, it remains a reactive form of assistance, and not preventative or "curative" as assistance for strengthening governance and peacebuilding might be.

As already observed in Figures 2 and 3, assistance to CPRPS did not increase during this period. Assistance to the related Government and Civil Society sector declined significantly during the first 10 years of this period, then increased during the final years of the period. As discussed above, this is the type of assistance that also contributes to softer, more social approaches to building peace and social stability. Thus, while there is no evidence of increased securitization (aid expansion) in the "conflict prevention" sectors

(sector 152), there is some evidence that the prioritization of better public and civilian governance processes declined, at least until about 2015. Health and Reproductive Health remained a major sector of Canadian assistance, reflecting both the earlier Stephen Harper government's Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health, and more recently the Feminist International Assistance Policy prioritization of women's health issues. Education and Multisector Aid show significant declines, though the later may be due to greater effort to allocate aid programs to specific sector purposes. General trends that can be noted are that assistance in many sectors declined during the middle years of this period, reflecting absolute declines in overall development assistance during several years during this period, and that assistance in most sectors increased during the final years of this period, reflecting overall increases in development assistance beginning in 2016–17.

Figure 4. Canadian Development Assistance Sectoral Allocation. Based on Table B1 in Statistical Report on Int'l Assistance

A more detailed understanding of the above trends can be gained when the main individual purpose codes within the two sector codes of Government

and Civil Society (OECD sector 151) and Conflict Resolution, Peacebuild-ing, and Security (OECD Sector 152) are plotted, as shown in Figure 5. Polynomial trends lines are again presented, in order to smooth year-to-year fluctuations. This figure reveals significant changes in assistance amounts to specific sectors, and thus changing priorities within these sectors. The strongest trend is a sharp decline in assistance to Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management, which was by far the large single purpose for assistance in the two sectors, but which decreased by approximately two-thirds during the twelve-year period. Assistance in this sector is provided for the purpose of institution building "to strengthen core public sector man-agement systems and capabilities,"[55] though not sector-specific ministries. Assistance for Democratic participation and civil society, specifically related to non-electoral governance issues such as referenda, advocacy, and civic education, also declined strongly. Other purposes within the Government and Civil Society sector remained largely constant, including assistance for Human Rights, Legal and Judicial Development, and Elections.

Figure 5. Trends in Canadian Development Assistance to Purpose Codes in the Government and Civil Society sectors (OECD code 151 and 152)

On the CPRPS side, the purpose code with the most significant change was assistance for Security System Management and Reform, which increased during the first part of the period, and then decreased again. (While the information from the SR-IA does not allow determination of the top recipient countries for each sector and purpose code, querying the OECD-CRS dataset shows that larger amounts of assistance to police capacity building in Afghanistan and Haiti during this middle period caused the trend observed.) Assistance to International Peacekeeping Operations and for Landmine Clearance was stable during this period. Significant increases in assistance toward the end of the period was made in Civilian Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention and Resolution, and even more strongly, to two purposes linked to the introduction of the Feminist International Assistance policy—Women's Equality Organizations and Ending Violence to Women and Girls (which are two separate purpose codes, but are merged in a single category in Figure 5). Overall, the trends for the various individual purpose codes do not show a strong or consistent change pattern in the composition of Canadian support for CPRPS. Assistance levels have remained relatively stable in most sectors and seem to correspond more to changes in overall ODA levels that particular strategic policy changes within the CPRPS sector.

DELIVERY CHANNELS FOR ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, PEACEBUILDING, AND SECURITY

The types of organizational channels used to implement programs and projects (often called the "executing agency"), particularly in sensitive sectors such as CRPBS, can also be assessed to help understand whether assistance more or less likely serves developmental goals or more potentially self-interested security goals.[56] The HPDS was used for this purpose, since (as discussed above) only it provides information on the recipient name and organizational type for the organization that implements each individual aid activity (e.g. programs, projects, technical cooperation, budget support). Only in 2014–15 does the HDPS begin to include disbursements made from the International Security section of the newly formed DFATD (following the merger of CIDA with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade the previous year). Thus a comprehensive dataset with almost all assistance disbursements to the CRPBS sector is only available for the five

years from 2014–15 to 2018–19, and only a static assessment of the recent allocation of assistance to the CRPBS sectors is possible.

The amounts of assistance provided through six "sub-classes"[57] or categories of recipient implementing organizations, for nine purpose codes in the 151 and 152 sector codes, were calculated. These nine codes were selected because they were the most important purposes, in terms of the amounts of assistance (all received over $175m over the five years). Since the final three years of this period also include data on specific non-ODA security purpose codes that GAC started to include in the Statistical Report, the two purpose codes with the largest amounts of assistance in this "non-ODA" group were included in the nine selected codes. This provides a comparison of the organizational delivery channels used for this type of assistance, compared to "developmental" CRPPS assistance. Total official assistance (i.e. both ODA and non-ODA) was calculated for all nine purpose codes, though for most ODA-eligible codes, official assistance only added 5–10% to the ODA amounts. The results are presented in Figure 6.

These results show that there is considerable variability in the types of delivery channels most commonly used, depending on the purpose of the assistance. International financial institutions are used to deliver the greatest amount of assistance for public sector policy and administrative management, primarily the African Development Bank (66% of assistance) and the World Bank (23% of assistance). Canadian civil society organizations are used to deliver the greatest amount of assistance for democratic participation and civil society—the list of recipient organizations included a total of over eighty-five Canadian NGOs, associations, specialized institutes, professional organizations, volunteer sending organizations, universities, and other types of civil society organizations (CSOs), with thirty-five of them receiving more than $1m each over the five years for activities in this sector (data not presented). Both of these organizational delivery channel concentrations can be considered to be expected or logical; international financial institutions, such as the multilateral banks, tend to have expertise in and emphasis on issues of economic public sector governance, while civil society organizations are obvious organizations to implement programs that aim to build participatory civil society capacity. Both types of organizations can also generally be assumed to be motivated primarily by the development needs and priorities of recipient countries, as they are not directly managed by donor governments. Yet both can also be assumed to adhere to

mainstream (i.e. broadly neoliberal) approaches to political and economic governance. As well, since almost all the funding to Canadian CSOs is project-based funding, which is subject to GAC planning approval (in terms of project purpose, methods, and outcomes), these CSO programs do have significant Canadian government control.

Figure 6. Organizational Delivery Channels for Canadian Official Assistance to Sectors 151 and 152, 2014-2015 to 2018-2019.

UN agencies were important recipients/implementers in several sectors, most obviously in International Peacekeeping, but also in Civilian Peace-building and Conflict Prevention, Human Rights, and Legal and Judicial Development. This is appropriate, since the primary purpose of the UN since its establishment has been international peace and security (and not development assistance).[58] In the field of development studies, multilateral organizations, particularly the UN organizations, are considered to be more neutral and oriented to the needs of recipient countries, and less to the strategic interests of donors, than organizations, particularly government agencies, from the bilateral donor.[59] However, the assistance to multilateral organizations can be of several types and, since the names of recipient agencies and type of contribution are included in the HPDS, this could be

analyzed. For all the ODA-eligible purpose codes in the 151 and 152 sector codes, 30% of Canadian assistance to UN bodies was core support, 38% was "contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds," and 25% for "project-type interventions."[60] Programming supported by core agency support is generally considered to be fully controlled by the recipient organization, while project-type funding is fully planned, in terms of priorities and goals, by the donor, with "contributions to specific-purpose programmes" being jointly determined. Thus, a significant proportion of programming in these sectors delivered by the UN seems to be relatively arms-length from possible Canadian self-interest.

The final two (non-ODA) purpose codes included in Figure 6, Non-Lethal Assistance to Security Forces (purpose code 15294) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons Threat Reduction (purpose code 15299), show marked contrast in their delivery channels. Almost all of the $280m in the former purpose code was received by an "Other Multilateral" organization. The disbursement to this sector was unique, in that it consisted of one very large $247m "project-type intervention," titled "Support to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund 2016–2019," provided to NATO as the executing agency. The project description and expected results (available on GAC's Project Browser), focused on the "stabilization and reconstruction" of the Afghan Defence and Security Forces, clearly are outside the boundaries of development assistance.[61] In contrast, there is no single predominant delivery channel for the $194m in assistance to the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons Threat Reduction purpose code (itself clearly a product of Western "weapons of mass destruction" security concerns).[62] There are over 80 agencies and institutes listed in the HPDS as recipients/executing agencies for this sector, with top recipients ranging from the International Atomic Energy Agency (to remove disused hospital-stored radioactive waste in developing countries), to the Canadian Commercial Corporation (a federal Crown Corporation with seventeen technical cooperation biological and nuclear security projects with national agencies in other countries), to the US National Department of Defence (for nuclear security cooperation in developing countries), to the World Health Organization (to support bio-security readiness). Both these types of international assistance, while clearly not intended to promote economic and social welfare in recipient countries directly, do provide regional or global "public goods" related to security.

DISCUSSION

While there are a vast number of detailed analyses that could be pursued in the available data on aid disbursements, and bits of evidence found to support many interpretations of how and why Canadian international assistance has evolved in response to domestic and global pressures, this section will discuss the most important findings.

The methods used in the comparative assessment of the HPDS, SR-IA and OECD CRS shows that, for historical trend analysis of Canadian international assistance (that include years prior Canada's aid agency reorganization in 2014–15), the SR-IA is the most complete record of disbursement data. Only the SR-IA includes all assistance that was delivered by CIDA/DFATD and other Canadian government departments, and unlike the HPDS and OECD CRS data, it includes both bilateral and multilateral assistance disbursements. Analyzing the information in the SR-IA is more difficult, however, as the data is only available in pre-set tables, and requires time-consuming manual manipulation and compilation of the tables, as this study did with the Table B1 from twelve years of reports. As well, since both ODA and other official assistance are included but not disaggregated (particularly the sectoral/purpose code tables, and recipient country tables), analysis focusing only on ODA is difficult. In general, it can be said that comprehensive, transparent, and easy-to-use data for features of Canadian international (development) assistance are not available for years prior to 2016.

The ambiguity created by the Canadian government's practice of including, since 2007–08, all international assistance, and not just ODA, in the annual SR-IA (reflected both in the utilization of additional non-OECD-DAC purpose codes and the use of "international assistance" and not "development assistance" in its title), can be seen as a telling precursor to the collapsing of CIDA as an independent development agency. Similarly, the inclusion of non-ODA expenditures in the HPDS starting in 2016–17 is a practical result of this organizational integration, following the principles of a more realist whole-of-government approach to security and development. These changes in how the Canadian government reports its international assistance appears to be in line with ongoing discussions at the OECD on linking development assistance more closely with peace and security goals,

particularly as articulated in the SDGs.[63] These changes do mean that the HPDS now contains very comprehensive data (starting in 2016–17) on Canadian international assistance, and so has become a more powerful tool for analyzing current and future aid policy and programming trends related to securitization and evolving whole-of-government approaches.

While there is closer integration of all international assistance reporting with the newly formed GAC, there is little evidence of actual increased securitization of Canadian development assistance, as (narrowly) measured by either increased roles of security-mandated departments of the Canadian government or funding levels to the CRPBS sector. The "whole-of-government" approach has not resulted in greater roles, over the twelve years, for the RCMP or Department of National Defence as sources of security-related international assistance. Support for related non-ODA security sectors also remains relatively constant during this period, though it is impossible to say if ODA would have instead been increased if these allocations of assistance had not been made. Support to broader public governance capacity, as measured by funding to the government and civil society sector, has declined somewhat, which could be interpreted as a retreat from support for CRPBS, based on the experience of donors in the 2000s of the difficulty of building state and civil society capacity for inclusive governance in so-called fragile states. At the same time, humanitarian assistance has greatly increased, evidence that responses to conflict and insecurity have increased, but only in a reactive mode. These opposing trends could be interpreted as reflecting the failure to invest enough in strategic and preventative programs to assist the development of capacity to prevent and resolve conflict in many developing countries. Yet such an interpretation would require holding an optimistic view of the role and ability of any technocratic external aid interventions to build the complex, contextually specific institutions and practices of effective accountable governance in diverse Southern countries. In any case, assistance to the sector continues to be a relatively small part of overall Canadian international assistance programming, which remains focused on more direct or immediate development concerns, such as women's empowerment, health, economic infrastructure, and productive sectors.

The more fine-grained analysis of the sub-sectors (purpose codes) that make up the conflict, peace, and security sector reveals the breadth of intervention goals that contribute to peace, security, and development. Support for more general public sector and democratization objectives declined, support for

more specific objectives like human rights, elections and legal and judicial development remained relatively constant, while support to peace and security sub-sectors related to gender equality began to increase strongly from low levels in the final years of the period, reflecting the programming impact of the Feminist International Assistance Policy adopted in 2017. Yet assistance remained broadly distributed among all these subsectors, indicating ongoing Canadian commitments and relationships with international partners in all these subsectors, and the difficulty of making large, focused shifts in international programming. This is illustrated by the fact that there were over 1,100 unique projects in the CPRPS code (code 152), and over 1,400 unique projects in the Government and Civil Society code (code 151) during the five-year period 2014–15 to 2018–19.[64] Canada has valuable roles and relationships on a broad range of international issues in many regions and countries, and it has not been easy or necessarily desirable, for reasons of international engagement and standing, to change or narrowly focus this programming.

While it was not possible to assess any multi-year trends in the composition of the organizational channels used to deliver peace, security, and development assistance, the available data in the HPDS shows both significantly and appropriately different preferred delivery channels for specific types of assistance and the predominant use of multilateral (primarily UN) and civil society organizations. This result also does not provide significant evidence for increased securitization of Canadian assistance, in terms of the predominant utilization of own-government agencies (such as the RCMP or the Department of National Defense) or private aid contractors to deliver programs.

These findings that Canadian international assistance has not become more securitized in terms of financial allocation are largely consistent with Brown's analysis, summarized above.[65] Histories of Canadian development assistance have shown that despite repeated attempts by successive governments to focus, prioritize, and modernize international assistance policies and to integrate international development assistance policy with other foreign policy goals since 2005, Canada's complex, multifaceted, and even fragmented aid program has tended to operate in largely the same manner.[66] The data analyzed in this article on aid allocation for conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security has shown evidence of this continuity over most of the twelve-year period studied. The two exceptions that could be seen are

significant assistance disbursements to the high-profile securitized intervention in Afghanistan and the very recent strong policy priority on gender quality.

There are other elements of securitization that this study did not assess, given the limitations of the data sources used. The most significant of these is the recipient country allocation of Canadian assistance. As discussed above, the SR-IA data include one table with the country allocation of total Canadian assistance (Table D1 in recent years of the SR-IA), but these individual country assistance totals are only disaggregated by GAC or other government department funding source, and not by sector or purpose code. It would be valuable to assess whether Canadian assistance has become more concentrated in fragile and conflict-affected countries, as would be predicted by the securitization thesis. It would also be valuable to compare Canadian assistance allocation, both sectoral and geographic, to that of other OECD donors, to determine whether Canadian assistance is more or less focused on the CRPBS nexus.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined three available datasets on Canada's international (development) assistance, and has found that the annual Statistical Report on International Assistance provides more complete data on Canadian financial flows to the conflict-peace-security-development nexus than the Historical Project Dataset or the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System. Using data primarily extracted from the annual Statistical Report, it has then described and assessed specific features of the Canada's assistance to the conflict, peacebuilding, and security sector over the past twelve years. Aid disbursement to this sector has not increased significantly during this period, nor have aid disbursements to related but softer sectors of government and civil society capacity building. This dataset does preview and then show the effects of the merger of CIDA with Canada's Foreign/Global Affairs department, in the increasingly open inclusion of non-ODA assistance to related security and conflict resolution sectors and in the changes in the government departmental sources of assistance. Canada continues to use a broad range of organizations, ranging from large multilateral bodies to many smaller NGOs, to deliver assistance, depending on the specific nature of assistance in each sub-sector.

APPENDIX TABLE 1

Table 1. Master Data Table compiled from Table B1, Annual Statistical Reports on International Assistance. Global Affairs Canada.
Figures are in Million $CDN

OECD-DAC Sector Code	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018	2018-2019	Grand Total
11xxx Education	539	583	656	491	325	325	344	458	377	383	347	442	5,270
12xxx Health	457	700	553	646	784	782	752	734	721	746	758	800	8,433
13xxx Population and Reproductive Health	211	444	149	192	233	218	205	251	189	231	342	373	3,037
14xxx Water and Sanitation	105	111	110	107	145	128	123	177	104	127	97	131	1,466
15110 Public sector policy & admin. mngmnt.	272	205	184	169	128	99	111	77	71	76	63	72	1,526
15111 Public finance management	38	35	49	72	83	44	60	75	49	33	35	52	626
15112 Decentralis'n & support to subnat'l gov't	1	2	30	28	37	30	36	54	24	36	46	47	369
15113 Anticorruption orgs & institutions	0	0	2	5	12	6	14	7	10	8	10	7	82
15114 Domestic revenue mobilisation								1	10	13	20	29	72
15130 Legal and judicial development	54	46	47	61	44	37	33	36	47	46	56	81	589
15140 Government administration	56	2											57
15150 Democratic participation and civil society	145	121	104	95	80	59	50	48	60	61	50	59	931
15151 Elections	16	46	17	34	10	24	15	19	29	15	9	15	251
15152 Legislatures and political parties	1	3	6	7	4	3	3	4	6	6	3	4	50
15153 Media and free flow of information	6	5	6	7	5	5	3	3	5	5	4	4	59
15160 Human rights	48	55	51	52	51	43	44	42	55	50	53	51	597
15170 Women's equality org'ns & institutions	7	8	9	6	5	6	5	5	5	1	4	43	103
15180 Ending violence against women and girls									4	11	28	48	93
15190 Facilitation of orderly, safe, ... migration											3	18	21
151xx Government And Civil Society	654	530	506	535	460	356	374	371	377	360	384	529	5,436
15210 Security system management and reform	43	89	57	150	163	83	92	131	112	26	18	35	999
15220 Civilian peacebuild'g, con. prev. & resol'tn	35	18	64	49	23	22	17	21	30	63	79	79	501
15230 Particip'tn in int'l peacekeep'g operat'ns.	46	39	27	29	50	33	29	18	23	69	51	50	464
15240 Reintegration & control of sm. arms light weapons (!	3	2	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	1	2	4	18
15250 Land mine clearance	47	38	19	29	16	6	6	6	11	13	12	15	219
15261 Child soldiers (prev. & demobilis'n)	2	2	15	3	3	2	2	3	1	1	2	1	37
1529x Other peace and security (non-ODA)										221	235	129	586
152xx Confl. Prev. Resol'tn, Peace & Security (ODA only)	176	188	184	262	257	147	146	180	177	173	164	185	2,239
152xx Conflict Prev. & Resolution, Peace & Security	176	188	184	262	257	147	146	180	177	395	400	314	2,825
16xxx Social infrastructure and services	117	93	77	73	87	84	95	118	97	88	131	153	1,214
21/22/23xxx Infrastucture (Trans, Comm, Energy)	270	175	225	507	444	496	219	416	247	341	428	486	4,254
24/25xxx Banking, Financial & Business Services	131	135	157	119	111	128	132	119	123	123	152	161	1,581
31xxx Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	265	247	659	436	402	368	275	361	361	326	307	331	4,339
32/33xxx Industry & Trade	69	75	105	121	129	112	114	95	159	157	117	143	1,395
41xxx Environmental Protection	106	133	103	117	176	178	93	100	260	125	121	228	1,741
43xxx Multisector Aid	429	555	363	568	526	724	415	816	384	278	521	404	5,983
72xxx Humanitarian Assistance	341	546	592	569	599	528	857	847	738	823	897	919	8,256
9xxxx Other Aid Expend. (incl. 'sectors not specified')	631	956	937	960	941	919	823	799	1,117	1,105	1,095	981	11,264
TOTAL International Assistance	**4,540**	**5,429**	**5,335**	**5,679**	**5,700**	**5,483**	**4,966**	**5,842**	**5,430**	**5,607**	**6,098**	**6,395**	**66,504**
TOTAL Intl Assist less admin/ops, refugees, awareness	4,008	4,910	4,721	5,019	5,064	4,964	4,474	5,301	4,617	4,678	5,097	5,428	58,282

ENDNOTES

1   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), *Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus* (Paris: OECD-DAC, 2019), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/dac-recommendation-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus.

2   For example, Maria Stern and Joakim Ojendal, "Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?" *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 1 (2010): 5–30; Ramses Amer, Ashok Swain, and Joakim Ojendal, *The Security Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development* (London: Anthem Press, 2012); Bjorn Hettne, "Development and Security: Origins and Future," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 1 (2010): 31–52; Eamonn McConnon, *Risk and the Security-Development Nexus* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Ivica Petrikova, "Donors and the Peace-Security-Development Nexus," in *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Alpaslan Ozerdam, and Jonathon Kent (New York: Routledge, 2020), 285–96; Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?" Global Governance 13 (2007): 35–58; Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen, and Finn Stepputat, eds., The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa (Cape Town: HSRC Press; Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007).

3   These benefits and challenges of interdisciplinary attention to the interrelated issues of conflict, peace, and development are exemplified by the articles in this special theme issue of *Peace Research*, all written by faculty in the Conflict Resolution Studies and International Development Studies programs at Menno Simons College at Canadian Mennonite University.

4   Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed, 2001); Stephen Brown and Jorn Gravingholt, "Security, Development and the Securitization of Foreign Aid," in *The Securitization of Foreign Aid: Trends, Explanations and Prospects,* ed. Stephen Brown, Jorn Gravingholt, and Rosalind Raddatz (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016): 1–17.

5   Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?*

Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to Fragile States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).

6   Brown and Gravingholt, "Security, Development and the Securitization"; Kari Pahlman, "The Securitization of Aid and the Associated Risks to Human Security and Development," *Australian National University Undergraduate Research Journal* (2014): 49–61.

7   Petrikova, "Donors and the Peace-Security-Development Nexus"; Melita Lazell and Ivica Petrikova, "Is Development Aid Securitized? Evidence from a Cross-Country Examination of Aid Commitments," *Development Policy Review* 38, no. 3 (2020): 323–43; Mark Furness, "'Donorship' and Strategic Policy-Making: Germany's Middle Eastern and North African Aid Programme since the Arab Uprising," *Development Policy Review* 38 (2020): 70–90. In non-fragile states, whole-of-government approaches tend to align development assistance with donor commercial (investment and trade) interests.

8   Conor D. Seyle, "Operationalizing Positive Peace : Canadian Approaches to International Security, Policy and Peace," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace,* ed. Aigul Kulnazarova and Vesselin Popovski (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 193–213; Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Philippe Lagassé, "Canada and the Bureaucratic Politics of State Fragility," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 20, no. 4 (2009): 659–78; Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?*

9   Desrosiers and Lagasse, "Canada and the Bureaucratic Politics of State Fragility."

10 Stephen Brown, "From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back: The Securitization of Canadian Foreign Aid," in *The Securitization of Foreign Aid,* ed. Stephen Brown and Jorn Gravingholt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Stephen Baranyi, "Canada and the Security-Development Nexus in Haiti: The 'Dark side' or Changing Shades of Gray?" *Canadian Journal of Foreign Policy* 20, no. 2 (2014): 163–75; Stephen Baranyi and Themrise Khan, "Canada and Development in Other Fragile States: Moving beyond the 'Afghanistan Model,'" in *Rethinking Canadian Aid,* ed. Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer, and David R. Black (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2016), 237–54; Stephen Baranyi and Anca Paducel, "Whither Development in Canada's Engagement in Fragile States?" in *Struggling for Effectiveness:*

CIDA and Canadian Aid Policy, ed. Stephen Brown (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012), 108–34; Liam Swiss, "Gender, Security and Instrumentalism: Canada's Foreign Aid in Support of National Interest?" in *Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid,* ed. Stephen Brown (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012): 131–58.

11   Brown, "From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back"; Swiss, "Gender, Security and Instrumentalism."

12   William Hynes and Simon Scott, *The Evolution of Official Development Assistance: Achievements, Criticisms and a Way Forward, OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers,* No. 12 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013).

13   OECD-DAC, *Official Development Assistance—Definition and Coverage,* accessed 21 July 2020, http://www.oecd.org/development/ financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/ officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm. The other two requirements are that the assistance be concessional in nature (which, until it was recently changed to a more complex definition, meant it was either a grant, or if a loan, had at least a 25% "grant" element), and that it originate from official (meaning governmental) sources. Assistance by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is excluded from official development assistance (ODA), except the amounts that governments provide as funding to NGOs as implementing agencies.

14   OECD-DAC, "ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities," October 2017, accessed 8 December 2020, https://one. oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC(2017)22/FINAL/en/pdf;   OECD-DAC, "The Scope and Nature of 2016 HLM Decisions Regarding the ODA-Eligibility of Peace and Security-Related Expenditures," particularly Annex 2, accessed 8 December 2020, http://www.oecd. org/dac/HLM_ODAeligibilityPS.pdf; Michael Brzoska, "Extending ODA or Creating a New Reporting Instrument for Security-Related Expenditures for Development?" *Development Policy Review* 26 (2008): 131–50.

15   Rudolphe Petras, *Comparative Study of Data Reported to the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Aid Management Platform*

(AMP) (Paris: Development Gateway and OECD, 2009), 10, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/43908328.pdf.

16   For example, Lazell and Petrikova, "Is Development Aid Securitized?"; Brown, "From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back."

17   Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, "Preventing, Substituting or Complementing the Use of Force? Development Assistance in Canadian Strategic Culture" in *Rethinking Canadian Aid,* ed. Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer, and David R. Black (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2016), 151, citing Keith Spicer, *A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 14–22.

18   Conor D. Seyle, "Operationalizing Positive Peace: Canadian Approaches to International Security, Policy and Peace," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace,* ed. Aigul Kulnazarova and Vesselin Popovski (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 193–213; Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?*

19   Andrew Godefroy, "Executive Summary," in *Canada's International Policy Statement Five Years Later* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010).

20   Scott Gilmore, "Why Merging CIDA into Foreign Affairs Strengthens Canada's Aid Program," *Maclean's,* 21 March 2013.

21   Kim Mackrael, "Foreign-Aid Agency Cut, Merged with Foreign Affairs and Trade Department," *Globe and Mail*, 21 March 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/foreign-aid-agency-cut-merged-with-foreign-affairs-and-trade-department/article10074258/; Nilima Gulrajani, "Merging Development Agencies: Making the Right Choice" (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2018), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11983.pdf.

22   Global Affairs Canada, *Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy* (Ottawa, ON: Global Affairs Canada, 2017), https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng.

23   Global Affairs Canada, *Statistical Report on International Assistance 2017–2018* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2019), 9.

24 For example, Stephen Brown, "CIDA under the Gun," in *Canada among the Nations 2007*: What Room for Manoeuver? ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008): 172–207; Brown, "From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back"; Stephen Brown, "The Instrumentalization of Foreign Aid under the Harper Government," *Studies in Political Economy* 97, no. 1 (2016): 18–36.

25 Brown, "From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back."

26 Ibid.

27 Baranyi, "Canada and the Security-Development Nexus"; Baranyi and Khan, "Canada and Development in Other Fragile States"; Baranyi and Paducel, "Whither Development in Canada's Engagement."

28 Baranyi and Paducel, "Whether Development in Canada's Engagement," 110.

29 Swiss, "Gender, Security and Instrumentalism."

30 Ibid., 139.

31 The most recent seven years are available on the Global Affairs Canada website, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/odaaa-lrmado/sria-rsai.aspx?lang=eng. Reports for years prior to 2012–13 are difficult to find, requiring a search of the "Browse Publications" on the general Government of Canada Publications website. Prior to 2006–7, it was titled the "Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance." Global Affairs Canada, "Statistical Report on International Assistance," accessed 25 May 2020, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.505918/publication.html.

32 Global Affairs Canada, *Historical Project Data Set,* accessed 22 June 2020, https://www.international.gc.ca/department-ministere/open_data-donnees_ouvertes/dev/historical_project-historiques_projets.aspx?lang=eng.

33 OECD, *Creditor Reporting System* (CRS), accessed 22 May 2020, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1.

34 The Minister of International Cooperation is formally required by the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act to issue this report, to "further enhance the efficiency and accountability of Canada's international assistance" (Global Affairs Canada, *Statistical*

Report on International Assistance 2016–2017, 1). The Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (ODAAA) was passed in 2008 and requires the Minister "to be of the opinion" that activities being reported to Parliament as ODA "contribute to poverty reduction, take into account the perspectives of the poor, and be consistent with international human rights standards" (Government of Canada, The Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/odaaa-lrmado/index.aspx?lang=eng). While considered relatively toothless, the necessity of such an act illustrates the concerns that international assistance may be used for other purposes.

35 OECD-DAC, "Technical Guide to Terms and Data in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities Database," accessed 11 December 2020, http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/crsguide.htm. However, it does include bilateral aid, delivered on a program or project basis, by multilateral agencies acting as implementing agencies for bilateral donors.

36 Ibid.

37 OECD-DAC, Purpose Codes: Sector Classification, accessed 16 December 2020, http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/purposecodessectorclassification.htm. See also OECD-DAC, *DAC and CRS Code Lists,* accessed 16 December 2020, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/dacandcrscodelists.htm

38 OECD-DAC, "ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities"; OECD-DAC, "The Scope and Nature of 2016 HLM Decisions."

39 OECD-DAC, "The ODA Coefficient for UN Peacekeeping," accessed 19 December 2020, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/ODA-Coefficient-for-UN-Peacekeeping-Operations.pdf.

40 For example, Brown, "From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back," 237–55; Lazell and Petrikova, "Is Development Aid Securitized?"; Swiss,

"Gender, Security and Instrumentalism."

41   For example, Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?" *Global Governance* 13 (2007): 35–58; Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jutersonke, "Peacebuilding: A Review of the Academic Literature," in *Peacebuilding: Critical Concepts in Political Science,* ed. Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jutersonke (New York: Routledge, 2015), 1–12; Birte Vogel, "Civil Society Capture: Top-Down Interventions from Below?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 10, no. 4 (2016): 472–89; Michael Findley, "Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 21, no. 1 (2018): 359–84.

42   Lazell and Petrikova, "Is Development Aid Securitized? "

43   Some small errors in tabulation were observed. For example, in the 2007–2008 Table B1, some row totals were inaccurate, as they excluded some figures in Other columns, but column totals were accurate. In all years, differences between column and row totals were less than 1.5% of total International Assistance. The data presented in this study (including in the Annex master data table) are the calculated totals of individual sector data.

44   Unpivoting rotates the data in a table, so that data in columns are each placed in a separate row, with the column names entered as labels in adjacent row cells. This allows further flexible merging and analysis.

45   CRS data can be selected as either commitments (total amount committed for a program/project, recorded on the year of commitment) or disbursements (actual amounts transferred each year during a program/project, often over several years). Since the Statistical Reports and HPDS reported disbursements, this data is more comparable. Data can also be selected as current $US (the actual amount in the year disbursed) or constant $US (adjusted for inflation to a specified year, to create equivalent values across years). Since the Statistical Report and HPDS data are annual reports, current amounts are more comparable.

46   OECD, *Exchange Rates (Indicator)*, accessed 21 May 2020, https:// doi:10.1787/037ed317-en.

47   For example, 2018 OECD data was put in the column for 2018-2019, since nine months of Canadian fiscal 2018-2019 (April to March)

overlap with calendar 2018.

48   OECD-DAC, "Technical Guide to Terms and Data."

49   In previous years, since Table B1 reports on total international assistance (both ODA and other assistance) but in most years no indication is given as to which sector this non-ODA is allocated, the lines are the same.

50   These purpose codes are: 15294 Non-Lethal Assistance to Security Forces, 15295 Cybercrime, 15296 Countering Violent Extremism and Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 15297 Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 15298 Preventing Violent Extremism, and 15299 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threat Reduction. The total assistance amounts each year for these five sectors is listed in Table 1 in the Annex under the summative purpose code 1529x Other Peace and Security (Non-ODA).

51   Global Affairs Canada, *Statistical Report on International Assistance 2016–2017,* accessed 11 December 2020, https://www.international. gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/odaaa-lrmado/sria-rsai-2016-17. aspx?lang=eng.

52   However, based on information in other tables (where international assistance and ODA expenditures are broken down by government department source), it appears that "other official assistance" expenditures are included in a "Sectors non specified" line at the bottom of Table B1 for the years 2009–10 to 2015–16. In the first two years of the twelve-year series included in this study, a separate row labelled "Other Peace and Security" is included at the bottom "Other Aid Expenditures" section of Table B1.

53   Sector codes with smaller amounts (and less direct linkages to conflict, peacebuilding, and security) are omitted from this graph, since they were difficult to distinguish due to overlapping at the bottom of the graph. Sectors omitted are 14xxx Water and Sanitation, 16xxx Social Infrastructure and Services, 24/25xxx Banking, Financial and Business Services, 32/33xxx Industry and Trade, 41xxx Environmental Protection. Some similar sectors were combined, including 12xxx Health and 13xxx Population and Reproductive Health, since the large majority of assistance in this sector was to sexually transmitted disease

control (including HIV/AIDS) and reproductive health care.

54   Using trend lines has the advantage of making it easier to see statistical multi-year trends, though they do mask year-to-year variability.

55   OECD-DAC, *Purpose Codes: Sector Classification.*

56   There is a large scholarly literature on "aid effectiveness," which is one of the key questions in development studies and practice. Criteria for "effectiveness" have been focused on aid's relationship to economic growth, but have also looked at issues such as poverty reduction, cost efficiency, support for democratization and alignment with recipient country priorities. Key surveys of this literature are Roger Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Work?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Roger Riddell, "Does Foreign Aid Really Work? An Updated Assessment," Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 33 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2014), and more recently, Edmore Mahembe and Nicholas Odhiambo, "Foreign Aid and Poverty Reduction: A Review of International Literature," *Cogent Social Sciences* 5, no. 1 (2019), https://doi:10.1080/23311886.2019.1625741. This research is linked to significant recent research and policy work on "aid quality," e.g., Nancy Birdsall and Homi Khara, *The Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA)* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2014). The question of aid delivery channels is just one element of the aid effectiveness question.

57   In the HPDS, GAC has three classification levels for recipient organizations: types (Canadian or foreign, non-profit or profit-making), classes (governmental, multilateral, civil society, para-governmental), and sub-classes (further classifications within the types and classes listed above).

58   Robert Picciotto, "Evaluating the UN Development System," in *Post-2015 UN Development: Making Change Happen?* ed. Stephen Browne and Thomas G. Weiss (New York: Routledge, 2014).

59   Nilima Gulrajani, "Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Channels: Strategic Choices for Donors" (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2016), https://www.odi.org/publications/10371-bilateral-versus-multilateral-aid-channels-strategic-choices-donors; Pierre E. Biscay, Travis W. Reynolds, and C. Leigh Anderson, "Relative Effectiveness of

Bilateral and Multilateral Aid on Development Outcomes," *Review of Development Economics* (2017): 1425–47.

60   Global Affairs Canada, *Historical Project Data Set.*

61   Government of Canada, Project Browser, accessed 16 December 2020, https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/ project-projet/details/P002278002. The description states the project goals are "to assist the Afghan National Army Trust Fund in promoting the future stability of a secure and democratic Afghanistan and ensure that the Afghan Nation Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are sufficiently trained and equipped to fulfill their responsibility for Afghanistan's national security." The project activities will include "training in human rights compliance, capacity building and security forces professionalization, recruitment and retention of women in the ANDSF, and building and maintaining infrastructure."

62   In Canada, for example, see Global Affairs Canada, *Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Efforts,* accessed 22 December 2020, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_ development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/ non_proliferation.aspx?lang=eng.

63   OECD-DAC, "Adjusting Purpose Codes and Policy Markers in Light of the SDGs" (OECD, June 2017), http://www.oecd.org/ officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/ STAT(2016)25&docLanguage=En; OECD, "Proposal to Include an SDG Focus Field in the CRS Database," OECD, May 2018, http:// www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=D CD/DAC/STAT(2018)41&docLanguage=En.

64   Data collected from the HPDS.

65   Brown, "From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back."

66   Stephen Brown, ed., *Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012); David R. Morrison, *Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011).