

## WORLD WAR I AND A PRAGMATIST'S DILEMMA

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This paper explores how American philosopher John Dewey used his pragmatic philosophy to support American military involvement during World War I and offers examples of its unforeseen consequences. As a practicing pragmatist and instrumentalist, Dewey initially reasoned that war might serve as an efficient means for bringing about a democratically organized world order. He argued that war could not be separated from the system of power politics in international relations or dissociated from the ends it sought to achieve. His pre-war philosophy, in contrast to his wartime position, emphasized the virtue of peaceful and intelligent solutions to problems. Dewey's conflicting ideas and writings, which responded to developing global conflicts, led to criticism of his true nature, pragmatic beliefs, optimism, and, ultimately, his democratic ideals. His failure to adhere to his previous position led wartime critics like Randolph Bourne to castigate his logic. Bourne was quick to point out that Dewey's pragmatic instrumentalism trapped him into miscalculating the relationship of the war to true national interests and democratic values. Dewey's excessive optimism led him to overestimate the power of intelligence and underestimate the forces of violence and irrationality. It took a war with all its violence, emotionalism, and excessive intolerance to convince Dewey that his own philosophical preconceptions concerning the progressive possibilities of military force were ill founded. In the aftermath of total war, Dewey discredited his own idealism while aligning his pragmatic instrumentalism with the goals of the liberal wing of the peace movement, a movement which insisted that peace stands for more than just the absence of war.

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## INTRODUCTION

As scholars, teachers, and students pay greater attention to the centennial of the United States' entrance into World War I, it is important to investigate the role that intellectuals played in the conflict. Why did many of the most famous minds in the United States use their intellectual faculties to justify military intervention in the world's first "Great War," only to retreat in later years in favor of a less bellicose mentality? What happened to change their minds and why? What lessons can be drawn in the case of the United States' most famous twentieth century philosopher, John Dewey?

In 1916, the noted American pragmatist and proponent of progressive education, John Dewey, penned his famous work, *Democracy and Education*. Typing from his desk at Columbia University, he put together a powerful reflection on how Americans should think about democracy as a system more than a form of government. To Dewey, democracy is a mode of associated living, a communicable experience in which individuals interact with one another for the common good. He envisioned a progressive experience in which people learn from one another to break down barriers of class, race, and national territory, factors that seemingly have prevented individuals from appreciating the full impact of their actions. The conflicting ideas and rationales purported by Dewey—pre-war and post-war—can be analyzed through debates, quotes, and articles through which Dewey reached the public as well as outspoken intellectuals of the time.

For democracy to work as Dewey envisioned, it also has to rely on dimensions of education. Dewey's reasoning was that education is the instrument for expanding the range of social interactions in which people can perceive issues ultimately responsible for changing behaviors and perceptions, thereby empowering humans to make sound and reasonable judgments. It was his way of stating that education is about growth and critical judgment. He argued that education is not merely for creating citizens or workers but rather human beings capable of adding meaning to their experience as well as the ability to direct future experiences. *Democracy and Education* was about designing schools that enable individuals to control their environment rather than simply adapting to it.

Beneath the tome's basic premise was a persistent hope that education, bolstered by the scientific "method of intelligence," would serve as a constructive instrument for the improvement of society and the civilized world. At the time Dewey was writing his magnum opus, Europe was caught in the

greatest conflagration the world had ever known. However, it did not stop Dewey from observing that "each [nation] is supposed to be the supreme judge of its own interests, and it is assumed as a matter of course that each has interests which are exclusively its own. To question this is to question the very idea of national sovereignty which is assumed to be basic to political practice . . ." He left the message for the educators that they must alter the environmental forces elevating the principle of national sovereignty as inviolable and replace it with ". . . whatever binds people together in cooperative pursuits . . . apart from geographical limitations . . . [and the] provisional character of national sovereignty in respect to the . . . more fruitful association of intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as a working disposition of the mind."<sup>1</sup>

An experimental approach to social and democratic alliances is at the heart of his philosophy of pragmatism. Dewey contended that the utilization of intelligence and scientific methodology, rather than coercive force, were the means for achieving the goal of a peaceful democratic society. In a 1917 essay he wrote before the United States entry into World War I, titled "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," Dewey pointed out that a "pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to . . . [peacefully] free experience from routine and from caprice."<sup>2</sup> Recovering philosophy meant stripping individuals from accepting past practices, like the custom of warfare, as part of human nature. His understanding of the customs of war were limited to local conflicts within and between nations in specific geographic regions rather than on a global scale.

The pragmatic method—a philosophy of social reconstruction based on action—was never challenged by the threat of world war once it seemed likely that the United States would be drawn into the conflict. Dewey felt that pragmatism was a philosophy promoting nonviolent solutions to societal problems—war being one of them. The type of world democratic community he envisioned is based upon a continuous, progressive "qualitative adaptation" of man and environment on a reciprocal basis. The use of violence contradicts the very principles of democracy and is clearly anti-intellectual in form and substance. He based his pragmatic belief in nonviolence this way: "There is an old saying to the effect that it is not enough for a man to be good; he must be good for something. The something for which a man must be good is capacity to live as a social member so that what he gets from living with others balances with what he contributes."<sup>3</sup> The ultimate

objective for any democratic way of life is to live harmoniously. This article outlines the focus of Dewey's pragmatic philosophy, which did not often align with the national behavior that accompanied global conflict.

As subsequent events showed, Dewey's optimism blinded him to a proper understanding of the war mentality and, even more importantly, his pragmatic philosophy was ineffective when faced with this new global predicament. The assaults on civil liberties, especially in a democratic society, had not been assessed when calculating pragmatism's effectiveness in waging a war for lasting peace. Discussed later is Randolph Bourne's stinging critique of Dewey's instrumentalism and those intellectuals who sided with him. Pragmatism, hailed as a measurement of idealism in times of war, failed the test. It would be the opponents—the pacifists as idealists—of war who proved to be the true realists in this instance.

#### INTELLECTUAL WARFARE

The impact of global warfare had never been challenged by intellectuals. Challenges to war within nation-states always existed but such challenges were now seriously mitigated due to the establishment of military alliances and security pacts among the warring governments. In addition, the nation-states were no longer neighbors which impacted the utilization of military force, long-term nationalistic goals, and means for sanctions. The problems associated with autocracy, imperialism, expansive militarism, and security alliances had ill-prepared liberal intellectuals such as Dewey. Dewey realized that German autocracy represented a direct threat to democracy and that the war in Europe had widespread implications for the United States. He decided that it was his duty to present a philosophical justification for the use of military force as an acceptable and intelligent means for bringing about a progressive international community based on democratic ideals—an idea he prized because it was compatible to his understanding of democracy. It was also in keeping with his self-anointed role as a public intellectual. Dewey hoped that the war would unite a romantic national idealism with a realistic progressivism. He considered it an opportunity to further his democratic ideals as part of a greater national service. With war now at hand, there was an opportunity to test the efficiency of progressive social engineering abroad and the collective will of the populace to bring about the kind of democratic progress needed to rid the Old World of its political tyranny and autocracy. Dewey's evolving position as an intellectual

and avid supporter of democratic ideals led him to be applauded and, at the same time, criticized with the inevitability of war.

This position was also in keeping with his liberal political philosophy. The basic tenets of his philosophy are based on liberty, individuality, and freedom of inquiry. As such, the importance of society and the environment in effecting the goal of individual improvement rested upon the national state. Given the exigencies of the current world crisis, it only seemed logical to him that this war could be employed to bring about much needed social and political reform at home and abroad on behalf of democratic progress. He sought to use his intellectual standing to rally the public behind his vision of making the world safe for democracy. Thus, it became imperative that the public be obedient to will of the national government to effectuate Wilson's goal of ending all wars and establishing global democracy.

Rather interestingly, in *Intellectuals and Society*, economist Thomas Sowell has pointed out that intellectuals have sometimes supported war and, in other instances, are vocal opponents. He argues that what is so distinctive about intellectuals in wartime is their perceived role as "anointed" decision makers and visionaries with an "over-arching common purpose" superseding the conflicting and disparate will of the populace. During war, the vision can flourish, but it can also produce unintended consequences. In terms of World War I, "it . . . [became] a devastating reminder of the horrors of war which had been ignored or under-estimated."<sup>4</sup>

Before Dewey could clearly articulate his concerns about battle, he came face-to-face with the fact that, ultimately, at least 8.5 million combatants were killed and many more wounded, untold numbers of civilians had died, whole empires were destroyed, and societies were devastated by modern technological warfare. His immediate purpose and first inclination was to convince the American public that, if armed force were to be applied, it should be done in an intelligent way to assist in the creation of a world order dedicated to equality and peace. Discussed in two of Dewey's 1916 articles, "Force and Coercion" and "Force, Violence and Law," this idea was that coercive force and war could not be separated from the system of power politics in international diplomacy. In true pragmatic fashion, Dewey reasoned that the war could not be dissociated from the ends it sought to achieve. The question, as he saw it, was one of clarifying the dynamics of social change.

On the one hand, there was force. Legal force in the form of military

enforcement was considered a legitimate lever of social change. On the other hand, violence was a wasteful force and therefore to be spurned. Realizing that his brand of philosophy had always called for action, Dewey believed it was possible to argue that the intelligent use of armed force was the only legitimate means by which to establish lasting peace based upon the principle of Wilsonian internationalism.

While providing his most detailed philosophical justification of his position on war in these two essays, he also revealed his innermost thoughts regarding his liberal philosophy. In these essays, he distinguished three conceptions of force: force as energy, coercion, or constraint, or as violence. As Dewey understood, the problem of “moralizing force” is the problem of “intellectualizing” its use through acts of persuasion, education, economic, and social incentives, as appropriate substitutes for physical force or coercion. It should be noted that Dewey was clear that the legitimate use of force did not imply that it be so wasteful as to justify the use of violence to achieve the ultimate end in question.

Not surprisingly, Dewey’s attempt to distinguish between force, coercion, and violence led to a public condemnation of pacifism as a philosophy of inaction and inertia given the current circumstances. For Dewey, pacifism became a negative concept; it implied withdrawal. In terms of his own philosophy, which continually stressed action, the pacifists’ method, he emphasized, “is like trying to avoid conflict in the use of the road by telling men to love one another instead of by instituting a rule of the road.” The pacifists’ lack of awareness as to the seriousness of the matter led Dewey to write to his readers in the *New Republic* that “at the very worst most of the young people appear to me victims of a moral innocence and an inexpertness,” which can only be overcome by realizing the possibilities of “intellectualizing” the use of force. Dewey now believed that pacifism is probably a good doctrine in time of peace but of no value in wartime. Pacifism, Dewey was convinced, showed a lack of faith in constructive, inventive intelligence.<sup>5</sup>

#### INTELLECTUAL COMMITMENT OF BEHALF OF FORCE

Fully committed to the view that the use of military force was justified and proper once the United States entered the war in April 1917, Dewey formulated a series of opinions aimed at convincing the American public of the rightness of his intellectual arguments. In the months of July, August, and September 1917, Dewey published four articles in the *New Republic*.

"Conscience and Compulsion," "The Future of Pacifism," "What America Will Fight For," and "Conscription of Thought" all illustrated Dewey's attempt to unify the country behind a program of socialized democracy for "binding up the wounds that had rent the body politic and putting an end to years of aimless drift." It was his initial disposition to believe that war might strengthen American democracy at home and international progressivism abroad. Thus, he felt compelled to show that the method of intelligence did not exclude the use of force in international relations. The net result of these four articles was Dewey's conscious effort to demonstrate the fundamental compatibility between pragmatism and war.<sup>6</sup>

Dewey began directly targeting those who still had "doubts, qualms, clouds of bewilderment" about America's entry into the war. To counteract what he regarded as "muddled thinking" on the part of the pacifists and to help expedite the war effort, Dewey called for more attention to the means of its prosecution. In "Conscience and Compulsion," the question, he decided, was not one of being overwhelmed by the forces of compulsion but rather one of allowing the conscience to develop "the machinery, the specific, concrete social arrangements . . . for maintaining peace." In "The Future of Pacifism," Dewey called upon "those who still think of themselves as fundamentally pacifists although they believed our entrance into the war a needed thing" to try to convert the aims of the war to agree with Wilson's ideals. In "What Will America Fight For," he stressed the need for a practical "business-like psychology" that would perceive the ends to be accomplished and make an "effective selection and orderly arrangement of means for their execution." He also spoke of pragmatism's help in enabling people to better understand the progressive social possibilities of the war. The extensive use of science for communal purposes and the creation of a world organization which "crosses nationalistic boundaries and interests" added to his conviction that the use of armed or coercive force might bring about his desired program of socialized democracy. Finally, in "Conscription of Thought," Dewey noted that pragmatism was not an ally of pacifism at this time and that "American participation should consist not in money nor in men, but in the final determination of peace policies which is made possible by the contribution of men and money." Here—in these four articles—was the pragmatic manifesto of Dewey's philosophy placed at the service of the country at war.<sup>7</sup>

What is so troubling regarding Dewey's analysis of the pacifist position

is that he failed to consider that many prewar peace advocates were very active in the movement to abolish war and relied on their pacifist views to promote international reorganization. Those who were critical of the war effort did not consider their actions as wasted power to protect democratic liberties against a wartime government's attempt to promote total conformity. In their criticisms of Dewey's position, they were quick to point out that he overlooked examples of American self-interest, such as insurance of the security of loans to allies, safety of American ships and cargos traveling to and from the war zone, the search for new markets, and the growing predominance of the United States in world affairs, thus demanding more of a bellicose nature in the name of national security. Dewey's failure to correctly assess the pacifist position in time of war was due to his own misunderstanding of how the philosophy of instrumentalism was as much an active method for peace as it was for war. The method of nonviolence and passive resistance—the lynchpins of pacifism—was by no means an inactive and powerless technique; it was based upon “permanent results rather than in momentary methods.”<sup>8</sup>

#### REACTIONS TO DEWEY'S LINE OF THINKING

There were some who questioned Dewey's rationale, such as fellow philosopher Paul Elmer More. Writing to friend Norman Smith, he felt compelled to point out:

I do not question what you say of the admirable personal traits of a man like Dewey . . . [still] I hold him nevertheless in reprobation . . . . To me a philosopher who preaches in season and out the sort of doctrine of education proclaimed by Dewey, who boldly proclaims that he wishes to see the world 'with the lid off' . . . is striking at the roots of everything that makes life worthwhile or even tolerable to me, Great God, what is this maniacal war but a world with the lid off?<sup>9</sup>

Just before the United States entered the war, one of Dewey's articles, “In Time of National Hesitation,” also caught the eye of the famous female radical, coeditor of *Mother Earth*, and antiwar opponent Emma Goldman: “I can imagine,” she wryly observed, “that a man like Dewey would be great in glittering generalities. This morning I read an article of his in the *Seven Arts*. It was positively empty. Not a single thought or idea worthwhile. But then, if he had ideas and the courage to speak out, he would most likely



go the way of Scott Nearing<sup>10</sup> and many others who refuse to serve King Mammon."<sup>11</sup>

Dewey's views captured the spirit of many other liberals and academicians of the time willing to unite a romantic national idealism with a realistic progressivism. Their position, in alignment with Dewey's—Dewey defined philosophy as the intellectual expression of a conflict in culture with the vital function of helping humankind understand social change—was not merely philosophical but also in keeping with the rhetorical dictates supporting democratic ideals as part of a greater national service. With war now at hand, there was an opportunity to test the efficiency of progressive social engineering abroad and to test the collective will of the populace to bring about the kind of democratic progress needed to rid the Old World of its political tyranny and autocracy. The experimental process of domestic reconstruction—bringing about needed social and political reforms to an urban-industrial society for the betterment of the people and furtherance of democratic ideals as expressed in *Democracy and Education*—was now ready to be tested overseas under armed conflict.

Several intellectuals joined Dewey in promoting the war as part of the progressive democratic mission, a struggle for social progress requiring international involvement. Among those who wrote on behalf of the war were Cornell historian Carl Becker in *America's War Aims and Peace Terms*, Wisconsin labor economist John R. Commons in *Labor and War*, and University of Chicago professor A. C. McLaughlin in *The Great War: From Spectator to Participant*. Others, such as Columbia historian James T. Shotwell and Guy Stanton Ford, dean of the graduate school at the University of Minnesota, also enlisted their talents "to make this a fight for the 'verdict of mankind' . . . that not only reached deep into every American community, but that carried to every corner of the civilized globe the full message of American idealism, unselfishness, and indomitable purpose."<sup>12</sup>

#### UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: ASSUALT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Dewey, and those of like mind, would have been better off had they heeded the warnings of More, Goldman, and others regarding their own objections to American military interventions as the fulfilment of Wilson's democratic mission. When Dewey asked readers of the *New Republic* to accept his philosophical explanation for the war, he did not expect American patriotic zeal

and intolerance to reach the unreasonable proportions that it soon achieved. Sadly, Dewey and his ilk watched helplessly as the growth of a negative nationalistic spirit ran counter to his own pragmatic idealism. "I confess I am a good deal disturbed and depressed by the present situation," he wrote to longtime supporter Horace Kallen. Efforts to silence labor radicals such as Eugene Debs, whom he voted for in the 1912 presidential election Socialist ticket, and anarchist groups such as the Industrial Workers of the World, added to his angst and fear that further revolutionary activity would occur. Other key events had Dewey struggling to proclaim his idea of intelligent use of armed force, such as the arrests of Goldman and Alexander Berkman in New York. "I do not doubt there are some agitators in the country who might well be in jail," he allowed, "but some of the recent arrests here in New York and the willingness of the US District Attorney to pass judgment on their cases almost makes me believe that some of the big interests are taking advantage of the present situation to try to put a stop to industrial agitation."<sup>13</sup>

What took place at his own university also almost brought him to his knees. The case of Leon Fraser, a young political scientist, highlighted the shortcomings of a democratic society at war. Fraser had just completed an article soon to be published in the *New Republic* criticizing the military training camp at Plattsburgh, New York. The article so inflamed the patriotic Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler that he demanded Fraser's resignation. When the young professor refused to resign under pressure, Butler summoned the board of trustees, which immediately dismissed him. Fraser's dismissal sent shock waves throughout the academic community. The prior dismissals of James McKeen Cattell and Henry Dana had already ignited a firestorm over the issue of academic freedom on the Morningside campus. Ultimately, these dismissals brought a sharp response and warning from Dewey's friend and colleague in the Department of Political Science, Charles A. Beard. Unfortunately, the board would not retract its decision, thus causing Beard to resign. The resignation greatly affected Dewey. As he told a reporter, "I regard the action of Professor Beard as the natural consequence of the degrading action of the trustees last week. I personally regret the loss to the university of such a scholarly man and teacher of such rare power."<sup>14</sup>

Such academic intolerance also filtered down into the public schools. Individuals were singled out and chastened or fired for their antiwar beliefs. This

was even more troubling for Dewey given his strong belief in the schools as instruments of democratic tolerance and understanding. As H.C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite's *Opponents of War, 1917-1918* and David M. Kennedy's *Over Here* point out, federal and state governments made every effort to convert schools into "seminaries of patriotism." More than one-hundred thousand school districts became receptive instruments of all ideological forms of guerilla warfare. Led by the National Education Association and the Committee on Patriotism through Education, district after district banned the teaching of German and demanded loyalty oaths of school teachers and support personnel. The New York Legislature, for instance, went so far as to create a commission to hear and examine complaints about "seditious" textbooks in subjects like civics, history, economics, and English literature. In elementary schools, teachers were instructed to teach the themes of patriotism, heroism, and sacrifice as well as the differences between German autocracy and the American democratic way of life.<sup>15</sup>

In many ways, New York City became the flashpoint. One Board of Education member, General Thomas Wingate, proclaimed that "the teacher who teaches pacifism and that this country should not defend itself is a thousand times more dangerous than the teacher who gets drunk and lies in the gutter." Despite elaborate hearings, defense counsel and all the appearances of a trial, the decision to fire teachers had been largely predetermined by the hysteria of the men in charge of conducting the proceedings. Throughout the city's school system, teachers were suspended or dismissed for questioning American military involvement, refusing to teach patriotism in their classes, or not taking the recently-enacted loyalty oath. Three teachers from De Witt Clinton's High School in Brooklyn were fired because of their socialist opposition to the war. A German-born elementary school teacher, Gertrude Pignol, was fired for wearing a locket engraved by her father and having a picture of the Kaiser's grandfather on one side and the cornflower on the other. Somewhat sheepishly, Dewey later confided to Beard "that nothing could be much more harmful to the real war cause in this country than giving the impression that the disloyalty issue was being used as a cloak for private and personal persecution."<sup>16</sup>

Perhaps nothing exemplified the height of patriotic intolerance in public schooling more than the dismissal of Phi Beta Kappa, Swarthmore College graduate, and Quakeress Mary Stone McDowell from Brooklyn's Manual Training High School. When she refused to take the loyalty oath

because of her Quaker faith, school officials promptly gave her a hearing and then fired her anyway. Little consideration was given to the historic protections of the Society of Friends' religious opposition to war. McDowell chose to challenge her dismissal in state court, but she lost. Her challenge was the first case in American legal history involving the issue of religious freedom in public education that went to a state court. Featured in the 1964 television series "Profiles in Courage," named after the recently assassinated President John F. Kennedy's 1956 Pulitzer Prize-winning book, McDowell was reinstated to her city teaching position in 1923 with an apology—the only one from New York City to obtain such reconsideration. This came in the wake of the newly-elected governor Al Smith's dismissal of the state's Lusk Committee's push for loyalty oaths during the postwar Red Scare.<sup>17</sup>

Clearly, the tentacles of war hysteria continued to reverberate in public education in cities such as New York, even after the armistice was signed ending hostilities in 1918. One of the more distasteful consequences of the war was the actions on the part of the state legislature, which, on 26 March 1919, established a joint committee of six under the chairmanship of Senator Clayton R. Lusk. Although an investigating and not a prosecuting body, this committee went out of its way to sponsor two new school laws. The first required a loyalty oath of all teachers and compelled any educators deemed guilty of advocating "a form of government other than the government of the United States or of this state" be removed from the classroom. The second law required all private schools to be licensed by the state education department and stipulated that no license be granted to any school "where it shall appear that the instruction proposed to be given includes the teaching of the doctrine that organized governments shall be overthrown by force, violence or unlawful means." It was only after Al Smith became governor that these laws were repealed. "I firmly believe," Smith proclaimed, "that I am vindicating the principle that, within the limits of the penal law, every citizen may speak and teach what he believes."<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, apart from New York State, the hysteria spread far and wide during the war. Another stunning example occurred in Bucksport, Maine. Veteran middle school teacher Lucina Hopkins was fired from her job because she took driving lessons from a German immigrant. Her husband had purchased a new car for her so that she could visit her ailing mother on the way home from work. Since she did not know how to drive, her husband hired a driving instructor, who was a German alien, to teach her. Hopkins

did sue in court, but the lower court ruled against her. The Maine Court of Appeals overturned the decision and awarded her four hundred dollars; however, she was never reinstated in her teaching position.<sup>19</sup>

Adding to Dewey's dismay was public vindictiveness toward those who opposed the war; he did not expect this outcome given his belief in the "pacific" nature of democracy as a way of life. Even though he had previously castigated pacifists and conscientious objectors for their alleged "passivity," he had counseled his readers not to be intolerant of their views on war. Approximately four thousand conscientious objectors were recorded, most of whom went into noncombatant military service; however, five hundred were court-martialed and imprisoned, seventeen were sentenced to death but never executed, and one hundred forty-two were given life terms but released by 1921. Many of the opponents of war underwent severe hardships, even the threat of death at the hands of their fellow Americans. The hard-core pacifists refusing any form of service at military camps endured harsh punishment. When conscientious objectors arrived at an army camp, the general practice was to get as many of them as possible to accept combatant duty. Labeling them as cowards and shirkers, military officers used all kinds of pressure to break the convictions of the objectors.<sup>20</sup>

Such treatment certainly reinforced Columbia alumnus Roderick Seidenberg's strong disappointment over Dewey's position. An architect and author of *Posthistoric Man: An Inquiry* (1950) and *Anatomy of the Future* (1961), Seidenberg was sentenced and served time at Fort Leavenworth because of his refusal to serve. "It appeared that the acknowledged leader of the American intelligentsia, Professor John Dewey," he wrote some years later, "had analyzed our attitude, and found it wanting." In Dewey's opinion, "we were the victims of moral futility, of an ego-centric lack of judgment that was close to being culpable. Our conscience was largely self-conceit." Feeling betrayed, Seidenberg remarked in anger and distain: "If Professor Dewey's participation in the war enterprise had no other effect, it at least allayed the last doubts of the more liberal-minded officials about condemning us. His utterances were retailed with unction, and we were reminded of the high source whence they came."<sup>21</sup>

Although Dewey clung to his position, criticism of conscientious objectors became so severe during the summer 1917 that even he admitted that "such young people deserve something better than accusations, varying from pro-Germanism and the crime of Socialism to traitorous disloyalty, which

the newspapers so readily 'hurl' at them-to borrow their own language." However, public reaction to dissent was strong. The Espionage Acts made it extremely difficult for anyone who wished to disagree or express disappointment with the conduct of the war. As Dewey began to recognize that his hopes for respect and understanding throughout the world would no longer prove feasible, even at home, he remarked sadly: "Treason is every opinion and belief which irritates the majority of loyal citizens. For the time being, the conservative upholders of the Constitution are on the side of moral mob rule and psychological lynch law." This "explanation of our lapse" proved to be a rude awakening for Dewey. Yet, having tied his whole philosophy to the war effort, he was incapable of finding a cathartic remedy for domestic intolerance. Overestimating the power of intelligence, all Dewey could say now was that "the appeal is no longer to reason; it is to the event."<sup>22</sup>

#### DEWEY UNDER FIRE BY LEADING SOCIAL REFORMERS

Both social reformer Jane Addams and leading socialist Norman Thomas could sympathize with Dewey's rational judgment that domestic intolerance is a dangerous notion. They would even defend and strongly endorse his observation that "when some affair of our own day demands cohesive action and stirs deep feeling, we at once dignify the unpopular cause with persecution; we feed its flame with our excited suspicions; we make it the centre of a factitious attention, and led it importance by the conspicuousness of our efforts at suppression." Those who are behind the "conscription of thought" are well aware that "many persons among us were pro-German in their sympathies; that there were others who were opposed to all war, and yet others with whom this was unpopular, and others who centered their hostility upon a policy of conscription." What led to this unsettling state of mind, Dewey openly proclaimed, "is not judgment, it is uneasy emotion troubled by its own lack of direct outlet in action, which clothes simple facts with dreadful and hidden import, which finds latent treason in German type, and power to paralyze the military arm in a conference of Greenwich Village pacifists or socialists."<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, their sense of appreciation had been drastically diminished by the fact that Dewey himself had abandoned their ranks. Dewey's defection had increased their despair and anxiety. It was a difficult period, Jane Addams recounted, when "every student of our time had become more or less a disciple of pragmatism and its great teachers in the United States

had come out for the war."<sup>24</sup> It was even more difficult for her to recall the days at Hull House when John Dewey spent a great deal of time teaching the values of human cooperation and understanding. The famous socialist pacifist Norman Thomas also found it hard to accept the logic of Dewey's article "Conscience and Compulsion." Thomas, indeed, could not believe his eyes when he read the article in the *New Republic*. Thomas was so incensed by Dewey's remarks that he made his own plea for "War's Heretics." Castigating Dewey for his unreasonableness in toying with man's conscience, Thomas went on to argue that "it cannot be too strongly insisted that the majority of conscientious objectors . . . believe that the same course of action which keeps oneself 'unspotted from within' will ultimately prove the only safe means for establishing a worthy social system."<sup>25</sup> To both Addams and Thomas, it was a sad fact that Dewey's pragmatism, which had served as a symbol of intelligent humanitarianism in the past, could so easily adjust itself to the dictates of war.

#### THE FORMER STUDENT NOW OUTSPOKEN CRITIC

Dewey's former student Randolph Bourne was the one person who truly called into question the misguided idealism of intellectuals supporting the war. Growing up in Bloomfield, New Jersey, Bourne worked as a piano accompanist in silent-movie theaters and made music rolls for player pianos. At the age of twenty-three, after earning enough money, Bourne entered Columbia College on a partial scholarship. A man of small stature with physical deformities, Bourne had imagination and determination. It was posited that he sought to compensate for his unattractiveness by devoting all his energies to writing. He possessed a very powerful intellect, which was charged by a radical outlook on life. Before the war, Bourne enthusiastically accepted Dewey's philosophy of progressive education and was also instrumental in spreading his former professor's ideas on the subject.

Dewey's support for the war therefore came as a shock to Bourne, who saw it as a direct contradiction to all the values for which he had stood. It was at that point when Bourne challenged Dewey's liberal disciples to examine and question the real horrors of a "capitalist peace at home." Dewey failed to see that his pragmatic idealism had caused him to miscalculate the irrational forces of war. Dewey's emphasis on utility afforded him no specific program to counteract the predominant trend of "vagueness" and "impracticality." To Bourne, it was obvious that Dewey had no concrete plan in mind for

the specific implementation of his democratic desires, either nationally or internationally, once the war ended. A philosophy of adjustment, Bourne felt, was no philosophy at all.

Bourne wrote a series of articles in radical magazines attacking the intellectuals' support for war, especially Dewey's viewpoint. Bourne's first attack appeared in an article entitled "Conscience and Intelligence in War." Objecting to Dewey's position, Bourne argued that war was an uncontrollable force which could offer no international benefits. In obvious contrast to Dewey's argument that "if we entered the war intelligently we would choose the ends which the war technique might serve," Bourne began by stating that "war is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means, and which speedily outstrips the power of intelligence and creative control." Was not Dewey's pragmatism placing technique above values, Bourne asked? Was not war a failure of the power of intelligence? Ending on a bitter note, Bourne severely chastised Dewey by saying that "it is perhaps better to be a martyr than a hypocrite. And if pragmatists like Mr. Dewey are going to accept 'inevitables,' you at least have an equal right to choose what shall seem inevitable to you." His article was such a devastating criticism of the pragmatic position on war that Addams felt compelled to write Bourne to tell him how much she had enjoyed reading it.<sup>26</sup>

One article of Bourne's stood out in regards to Dewey's philosophical reasoning behind his support for armed intervention: "Twilight of Idols," published in the *Seven Arts* in October 1917. "To those of us who have taken Dewey's philosophy almost as our American religion," he wrote passionately, "it never occurred that values could be subordinated to technique. We are instrumentalists, but we had our private utopias so clearly before our minds that the means fell always into its place as contributory." The argument of "Twilight" maintained that Dewey's naïve belief in the potential utility of war "pointed to two defects in his philosophy." One was his attitude of optimism, which led him to misinterpret the influence of intelligence in wartime. The other was his relation of thought to action, in which he "overly stressed technique at the expense of value." Both views, Bourne contended, were based on a method of expediency. The distinction between means and ends, Bourne emphasized, could no longer be evaluated by a pragmatic method in response to war. Understandably, the disappointed Bourne thought of pragmatism as a philosophy of technique. And although he admitted that Dewey hoped to develop his technique along with vision—a capacity for



framing ideals and ends—he felt that Dewey and his disciples had become completely technique-conscious and morally blind. In his denunciation of Dewey, Bourne deftly pursued his own pragmatic evaluation of Dewey's philosophy, concluding that pragmatism was not geared for emergencies.<sup>27</sup>

Dewey did not respond kindly to Bourne's criticisms that his pragmatism was nothing more than a philosophy of technique, "a philosophy which tells you how to accomplish your ends once the ends have been established." Many years later, while on a train traveling to the Trotsky hearings in Mexico in 1937, the novelist James T. Farrell pressed Dewey about Bourne. Finding it difficult to extract much information from a subdued Dewey, Farrell managed on this occasion to get Dewey to say, "Bourne was extremely clever and gifted, but he did not have depth."<sup>28</sup>

Still, Bourne's moral argument gave Dewey and his intellectual crowd concern regarding matters such as patriotism, domestic and international progressivism and the impact war has on such efforts, and the emotional responses accompanying military conflict. By highlighting that the pragmatic method was an instrument for peaceful social change that relied more upon moral reason than blind emotion, Bourne had initiated a new trend in Dewey's way of thinking about war and peace. Perhaps most of all, Bourne reignited Dewey's earlier assumptions and beliefs regarding the peaceful aspects of his pragmatic method.

Accordingly, the war and its tragic aftermath convinced Dewey that violence was not only immoral but also "un"pragmatic. The emotional impact of war had proved to be more complete than any appeals to reason and understanding. Thus, later he wrote:

We have depended upon the clash of war, the stress of revolution, the emergence of heroic individuals, the impact of migrations generated by war and famine, the incoming of barbarians, to change established institutions. Instead of constantly utilizing unused impulse to effect continuous reconstruction, we have waited till an accumulation of stresses suddenly breaks through the dikes of custom.<sup>29</sup>

Adjustment to past habits would now have to give way to a conscious reordering of society. Dewey noted in *Experience and Nature*:

we have not carried the plane of conscious control, the direction of action by perception of connections, far enough. We cannot separate organic life and mind from physical nature without

also separating nature from life and mind. The separation has reached a point where intelligent persons are asking whether the end is to be catastrophe, the subjection of man to the industrial and military machines he has created.<sup>30</sup>

Bourne's emphasis on nonviolence and reason helped produce Dewey's conversion to the antiwar movement. Bourne's criticisms were so telling that Dewey was compelled to write later that "what is needed is that the more rational and social conduct should itself be valued as good and so be chosen and sought." The importance of such a need, he also maintained, "is . . . to remake social conditions so that they will almost automatically support fuller and more enduring values and will reduce those social habits which favor free play of impulse unordered by thought, or which make men satisfied to fall into mere routine and convention." The means he employed for accomplishing this noble task were those of a pacifist, not a militarist: "The justification of the moral non-conformist is that when he denies the rightfulness of a particular claim [i.e., right to wage wars] he is doing so not for the sake of private advantage, but for the sake of an object which will serve more amply and consistently the welfare of all."<sup>31</sup> This statement is a far cry from his "business-like" opposition to the conscientious objector of World War I.

#### DISCREDITING IDEALISM AS AN OUTCOME OF WAR

By the early months of 1919, Dewey was voicing his own disillusionment with the prospects for international peace. His attitude underwent a drastic metamorphosis. In marked contrast to his wartime beliefs, he now reasoned that the war had failed to bring about a regeneration of the nation or a lasting advance toward international peace. The four-year struggle had been so destructive and widespread that the mere prospect of a future war evoked an overwhelming sense of dread. Yet, far from ensuring a permanent world peace, the Treaty of Versailles, he honestly feared, would lay the groundwork for future wars; it was, for all intents and purposes, the negotiated establishment of inequality. Almost a year after the armistice with Germany was signed, Dewey published his own interpretation of the work at the Paris Peace Conference: "The Discrediting of Idealism." Writing as one of those who, though "strongly opposed to war in general broke with the pacifists because they saw in this war a means of realizing pacific ideals," Dewey surprisingly added his own apology to that of his wartime critics:

"The defeat of idealistic aims has been, without exaggeration, enormous. The consistent pacifist has much to urge now in his own justification; he is entitled to his flourish of private triumphing." The defeat of idealism, he sadly concluded, was due to a failure of intelligence: an optimistic belief that physical energy in unison with morals and ideals could have a self-propelling and self-executing capacity.<sup>32</sup>

The principle blame for the catastrophe at Versailles, in Dewey's opinion, rested upon the shoulders of the "American people who reveled in emotionalism and who groveled in sacrifice of its liberties."<sup>33</sup> More important, the Versailles tragedy also demonstrated the American people's lack of faith in the intelligent use of armed force. "If the principle of [military] force to the limit had been in operation in behalf of our ideals," Dewey insisted, "the professed aims of the United States might have been achieved." In practice, he reflected, the United States should have insisted on the terms of its entry before going into the war on the side of the Allies. Dewey did not say how this could have been done or how military force was to be directed by intelligence. Though it was difficult for Dewey at the time, he had contributed to the illusion of coercive force and, therefore, was partly to blame for the failure of American idealism.<sup>34</sup>

Dewey's "discrediting of idealism" coincided with his own disappointment with a world peace organization. He abandoned his earlier support for the League of Nations. There was now much to contemplate as Bourne had forewarned:

There is work to be done to prevent this war of ours from passing into popular mythology as a holy crusade . . . There is work to be done in still shouting that all the revolutionary by-products will not justify the war, or make war anything else than the most noxious complex of all evils that afflict men . . . There must still be opposition to any contemplated 'liberal' world-order founded on military coalitions.<sup>35</sup>

He was convinced that, both structurally and functionally, it represented an implementation of a no longer relevant, undemocratic nationalistic philosophy and set of assumptions. Agreeing with the editorialist Walter Lippmann, who also had supported Wilson's war aims and held that "the results are so little like the promises," Dewey concluded that there was very little hope for the extension of government beyond national boundaries.<sup>36</sup> The results of this "Carthaginian Peace" convinced Dewey that the peacemakers had

devoted their attention not to an international organization dedicated to achieving a permanent peace but rather to “details of economic advantage distributed in proportion to physical power to create future disturbances.”<sup>37</sup> More than before, he now feared the corruption of democracy by outside influences while, at the same time, realizing the need for international cooperation.

Moreover, his article “Our National Dilemma,” printed in the *New Republic* on 24 March 1920, portrayed the country as faced with a dilemma: isolation was impossible and participation was perilous. Having discredited his own idealism, Dewey now maintained that the foreign policies of France and England were completely “non-democratic” and bent upon the destruction of Germany. The United States had an obligation, Dewey vigorously warned, “not to engage too much or too readily with them until there is assurance that we shall not make themselves or ourselves worse, rather than better, by what is called sharing the common burdens of the world.”<sup>38</sup> This line of reasoning or argumentation would have been more appropriate to the pragmatist argument at the beginning of the war than at its completion.

#### ENGAGEMENT WITH THE POSTWAR PEACE MOVEMENT

The inability to bring the war to a just conclusion and the birth of an intense and explosive nationalistic spirit were convincing proof of how excessively optimistic Dewey’s understanding of the progressive possibilities of war had been. In later years, Dewey disavowed the utilization of military force, sanctions, or economic boycotts as a rational and intelligent means for securing world peace. His rejection of the League of Nations after 1919, his reluctance to cooperate with Old World politics, and his general desire to avoid European entanglements merely point out how far he went in the opposite direction with regards to his view of international diplomacy—rightly or wrongly. Nevertheless, his willingness to entertain pacifist ideology and cooperate with peace groups as a means for altering the existing political and economic status quo—furthering democratic values and social reorganization—became woven into his own instrumentalist philosophy. His pragmatism after the war attempted to move the idea of peace as abstract and unattainable into a realistic means ethically and morally capable of achievement.

Clearly, reevaluating his philosophy also made the transition easier for Dewey when joining ranks with more liberal elements within the postwar

peace movement. Reenergized and refocused, the "modern" peace movement witnessed the growing radicalization of pacifism; personal witness became less inward and more outspoken in terms of social and political action. Liberal pacifism struck a responsive chord in Dewey's postwar pragmatic approach to international politics and domestic reform. Traditional pacifists who long asserted that the means determine the ends were in line with Dewey's philosophical position that ethical decisions, tied to non-violent force, were now relative to the demands of time and place. Equally significant, the postwar peace reformers, while still condemning violence, though in contrast to the traditional dictates of nonresistance, were also willing to sanction some aspects of coercion as a means of addressing racial, social, and economic justice.<sup>39</sup>

Perhaps the person most responsible for undertaking this intellectual conversion was Jane Addams. Naturally, the war had strained their personal friendship. Dewey applied Addams' definition of pacifism to the modern scene, which "used to stand for something . . . negative, for an attitude that made it easy to identify pacifism with passivism." Abandoning his World War I criticisms of pacifists—Addams was very disappointed at his wartime remarks considering their friendship—and his earlier attempt to explain the differences between force, coercion, and violence, he now considered the peace movement's goals "vital and dynamic." Given the war's results, the pacifists turned out to be the realists. The war, in fact, did little to establish a democratic, lasting peace. Dewey now openly acknowledged that his views on internationalism thus aligned with those of the postwar liberal peace movement as part of his democratic outlook: increased acknowledgment of the economic causes of war, rejection of national self-determination in favor of a "higher" nationalism, and initiating direct, political participation from the bottom up.<sup>40</sup>

Tellingly, his liberal political philosophy returned to its original roots with respect to individuality and liberty. The reactionary elements in time of war had stripped the democratic clothing protecting one's right to dissent. When he penned his 1935 political commentary, *Liberalism and Social Action*, which he dedicated to Addams, he took a much harder look at the use of force: "It is not surprising in view of our standing dependence upon the use of coercive force that at every time of crisis coercion breaks out into open violence." It was as if he felt it necessary to apologize for his misguided idealism nineteen years earlier. "In this country," he commented, "with its

tradition of violence fostered by frontier conditions . . . resort to violence is especially recurrent on the part of those who are in power.” How troubling it was that

“in times of imminent change, our verbal and sentimental worship of the Constitution, with its guarantees of civil liberties of expression, publication and assemblage, readily goes overboard . . . What is said about the value of free speech as a safety valve is then forgotten with the utmost of ease: a comment . . . upon the weakness of the defense of freedom of expression that values it simply as a means of blowing off steam.”<sup>41</sup>

Equally important, Dewey’s liberal outlook proved compatible with postwar peace activists who assumed a more aggressive posture, a proactive and dynamic activism; the new peace activists were more than willing to extend their criticisms as to the way diplomats conducted business as usual in the prioritization of national security. Instead, they insisted that, if the United States wished to take a leading role in reforming international relations, it would have to reconsider its longstanding practice of power politics backed by military force. Their moral and ethical commitment also led them to question the undue influence nationalism had on the public mindset. Like Dewey, they encouraged a new type of nationalism that crossed boundaries and called for a greater appreciation and respect for other cultures as a bridge to better international understanding. The call for public action outside the realm of established diplomatic procedures became the new benchmark. Indeed, as historian Nigel Young observed, modern peace activists not only added a moral dimension to their methods but also

a theory of conflict and a dialectic of action in a struggle that became an ‘experiment with truth’: testing ideas through political dialogue, exemplary conduct, and communication during conflict, rather than through political violence. In the United States, Gandhi’s ideas of nonviolent resistance blended with Reinhold Niebuhr’s pacifism, John Dewey’s pragmatism, and other strands of peace thought and civil disobedience.<sup>42</sup>

Like other postwar peace activists, Dewey began calling for a democratized international system in which responsible policy makers would follow the lead of the public, establishing peace through applied social justice and world agencies. He became a leading spokesperson for liberal internationalism during the interwar period. Dewey recognized that the “Old World”

system of sovereign states was anachronistic and no longer capable of promoting intra-state harmony. He further understood that the war system and European diplomacy, as it existed, had seriously destabilized the guiding principles of arbitration and internationalism; moreover, international publics must recognize the reality of working to control global events in order that a more inclusive, democratic world politics may come to fruition. According to scholar Molloy Cochran:

Dewey wrote on many themes important to liberal internationalists . . . What unifies these writings is an underlying concern that the moral inclusion of individuals be made effective in the relations between states, that a new diplomacy should arise out of the destruction of World War 1 . . . [allowing] recognition to the humanity of each individual and assist in the development of human capacities, making manifest the idea of democracy in international affairs.<sup>43</sup>

Dewey's involvement in the Outlawry of War crusade in the 1920s—the attempt to make war illegal culminating in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, also known as the Pact of Paris—illustrates Dewey's deep commitment to peaceful measures, not force and violence. He considered the crusade an extension of his democratic and social psychology. His direct intellectual and political involvement was to advocate that reason take precedence over emotion and blind trust. Unlike his bellicose position during the Great War, he now believed that, if more people were taught that war was a crime against humanity, coercive measures to prevent its recurrence would no longer be needed. Understanding would replace fear and agreement would replace distrust. The problem, Dewey insisted, was not what reprisals a nation must fear by committing acts of blatant aggression but the immorality of doing so. If the internationalism of the modern world, in its economic, psychological, scientific, and artistic aspects, was to be truly realized, outlawry of war was the most realistic means for firmly establishing “an international mind to function effectively in the control of the world's practical affairs.”<sup>44</sup>

Dewey's identification with participation in the Outlawry of War crusade, despite its inability to prevent the next world war a mere twenty-one years later, was in complete agreement with his postwar pragmatic approach to world peace. It was his attempt to inject his instrumentalism as a means for peace, not military expediency, an effort to unite international publics as an instrument to shape a more inclusive politics in lieu of leaving it solely to

the discretion of states. He no longer considered peace as an ideal but rather a realistic measure in the name of justice—less antiwar and more one of change to prevent future conflicts. The late Pulitzer Prize winning historian Merle Curti best captures Dewey's newly-adopted devotion to nonviolence:

If Dewey's dedicated devotion to this program seemed naively idealistic to some of his contemporaries as well as to historians, it was nevertheless an important testimony to his conviction that war might be eliminated if the world stopped thinking in terms of war and that an unlimited national sovereignty contradicted both common sense and social and human needs.<sup>45</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Peacemakers, so aptly characterized by Curti as “merely chips and foam on the surface of the stream of American life,” continued to work harder and to think harder. In doing so, Dewey now willingly joined them in attempting to strip away the negative arguments against war—it had been described as barbaric, immoral, and unchristian—by providing a more realistic approach to understanding problems associated with international conflict. His liberal ideas and rationale for entering the war, an important lesson for those who, today, may entertain such notions in the name of nation building and relieving oppressed populations, were now soundly rejected.

Dewey's World War I experience taught him that his philosophy of pragmatism—knowledge based on experience and observation—was better suited for providing citizens with the appropriate tools for making intelligent decisions to establish peace over the long haul than falling victim to the exigencies of war fraught with its unintended consequences. “If overtly and outwardly we are more nationalistic than at any previous time,” Dewey wrote in a book edited by leading pacifist Kirby Page, “we are also, as far as intellectual and moral currents concerned, more internationally inclined. The entire peace movement is less negative, less merely antiwar and more bent on establishing positive international cooperation.” Dewey held this position because the peace movement was now “less merely antiwar . . . it is also much more realistic.” Certainly, “while during the war, a man might find himself in jail for a too emphatic declaration that the causes of the war were economic rivalries,” Dewey asserted, “that is now a commonplace of discussion from admirals to the man in the street. It is a great gain that intelligent people now know where to look, what to give attention to, in



all cases of international friction." Postwar peace advocacy resolved his dilemma because it called into serious doubt the "glittering generalities about freedom, justice, and an end to all war as the objectives of a war." Such arguments, Dewey now openly admitted, had "lost much of their force." The pragmatist had finally arrived full circle.<sup>46</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

1. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1916), 97-8. Also consult Lawrence Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957* (New York: Vintage, 1964), 121-3.
2. John Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude*, ed. John Dewey et al. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1917), 63.
3. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 359.
4. Thomas Sowell, *Intellectuals and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 204. See also, Sidney Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors: Effects of World War I on Some American Liberals," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17 (June 1956): 360.
5. Joseph Ratner, ed., *Characters and Events*, vol.1 (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929), 637; *Characters and Events*, vol. 2, 577; Alan Cywar, "John Dewey in World War I: Patriotism and International Progressivism," *American Quarterly* 21 (June 1969): 579-89.
6. Ratner, *Characters and Events*, vol. 1, 477; Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 203-12; Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947), 161-79. White uses the term "destructive intelligence" as distinguished from "creative intelligence." His purpose is to point out Dewey's ambivalent stand regarding his philosophical support for the war.
7. Ratner, *Characters and Events*, vol. 2, 579, 564, 569; White, *Social Thought in America*, 168-9. Also consult, Sidney Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors: Effects of World War I on Some American Liberals," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17 (June 1956): 360.
8. Dewey, "The Future of Pacifism," in vol. 10 of *The Middle Works*, ed.

- Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 265-70.
9. Paul Elmer More to Norman Kemp Smith, 13 August 1916, in vol. 1 of *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-1952*, [http://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=Dewey\\_c\\_ii/Dewey\\_c\\_ii.02.xml;doc.view](http://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=Dewey_c_ii/Dewey_c_ii.02.xml;doc.view)
  10. Scott Nearing was an economics professor fired from his position at the University of Toledo for his outspoken opposition to U.S. preparedness and author of the American Socialist Society's forty-four-page pamphlet *The Great Madness* (1918).
  11. Emma Goldman to Agnes Inglis, 30 April 1917, in vol. 1 of *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-1952*.
  12. George Creel, *How We Advertised America* (New York: Harper Bros., 1920), 3-5.
  13. John Dewey to Horace M. Kallen, 3 October 1917, in vol. 1 of *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-1952*.
  14. John Dewey to A. A. Young, October 1917 (exact date undetermined), Dewey papers, Butler Library, Columbia University; *New York Times*, 9 October 1917, p. 1. See also, William Summerscales, *Affirmation and Dissent: Columbia's Response to the Crisis of World War I* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1970), *passim*.
  15. H.C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957), 102-12; David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), *passim*. Also consult, Arthur D. Dean, *Our Schools in War Time—and After* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1918), 2-9, 304-15.
  16. Peterson and Fite, *Opponents of War*, 110; Frances H. Early, *A World Without War: How U.S. Feminists and Pacifists Resisted World War I* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 39-40; *The Trial of Three Suspended Teachers of DeWitt Clinton H.S.* (1919), American Civil Liberties Union Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University; Howard K. Beale, *Are American Teachers Free?* (Washington: American Historical Association, 1936), *passim*; John Dewey to Charles A. Beard, 17 December 1917, in vol 1. of *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-1952*.

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18. Quoted in Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Decline of American Liberalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 235-6.
19. Charles F. Howlett, "Case Law Historiography in American Peace History," *Peace & Change* 22, no. 1 (January 1997): 52-3 and "Academic Freedom and Loyalty in Time of War," *Social Science Docket* 12, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2012), 4-6.
20. Stephen M. Kohn, *Jailed for Peace: The History of Draft Law Violators, 1658-1985* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1986), and *American Political Prisoners: Prosecutions under the Espionage and Sedition Acts* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); and Norman Thomas, *The Conscientious Objector in America* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1923).
21. Roderick Seidenberg, "I Refuse to Serve," *American Mercury* (January 1932): 91-9.
22. Ratner, *Characters and Events*, vol. 2, 577-8, 571.
23. Dewey, "Conscription of Thought," 276-8.
24. Staughton Lynd, ed., *Nonviolence in America* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), 185.
25. Norman Thomas, *War's Heretics: A Plea for the Conscientious Objector* (New York: American Union against Militarism, 1917), 3.
26. Randolph Bourne, "Conscience and Intelligence in War," *Dial* 63 (September 1917): 193-5; Cywar, "John Dewey in World War I," 579.
27. Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," in *War and the Intellectuals*, ed. Carl Resek (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 60-2.
28. Corliss Lamont, ed., *Dialogue on John Dewey* (New York: Horizon Press, 1959), 25, 30.
29. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1922), 101.
30. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 296.

31. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1908), 9, 229, 252.
32. Ratner, *Characters and Events*, vol. 2, 630-1.
33. Ratner, *Characters and Events*, vol. 2, 634.
34. Ratner, *Characters and Events*, vol. 2, 634-5.
35. Bourne, "War and the Intellectuals," *The Seven Arts* II (June 1917): 133-46.
36. Walter Lippmann, *Early Writings* (New York: Liveright, 1970), 89.
37. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), 128.
38. Ratner, *Characters and Events*, vol. 2, 619.
39. For an overview of the development of the "modern" American peace movement, see Charles F. Howlett, *The American Peace and Justice Movement from the Early Twentieth Century to the Present* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2016), 37-106. See also, Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1971), 329-44. Chatfield explains the evolution of liberal pacifism as a result of the Great War and its consequent focus on peace as a means of social justice.
40. Dewey's thoughts on this subject were clearly expressed in an introduction he wrote for a new edition of Jane Addams' 1922 work, *Peace and Bread in Time of War*. Dewey's introduction was published in 1945. See, John Dewey, "Democratic versus Coercive International Organization: The Realism of Jane Addams," introduction to Jane Addams, *Peace and Bread in Time of War*, rev. ed. (New York: King's Crown Press, 1945), xvii-xviii.
41. John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1935), 64.
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44. John Dewey, *Outlawry of War: What It is and Is Not* (Chicago: American Committee for the Outlawry of War, 1923), 9, 15-16. Scholarly works about the Outlawry of War movement are Robert H. Ferrell, *Peace in their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact* (New Haven, CT: Yale university Press, 1953), and John E. Stoner, *S. O. Levinson and the Pact of Paris* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943).
45. Merle Curti, "John Dewey and Nationalism," *Orbis X* (Winter 1967): 1117.
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