

ALFRED HERMANN FRIED (1864-1921):
TRANSITIONING TO WORLD ORDER

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Precedents can become a powerful means for peaceful change. Europe has been known not only for its wars but also for its many peace plans and key developments in international law. The Age of Enlightenment provided an impetus that eventually resulted in the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, which were the first universal Congresses attempting to abolish war as an institution. The two main objectives of the Hague Peace Conferences were disarmament and the creation of an international court with binding powers. Governments had realised that it was not possible to disarm into a vacuum, and that a legal system to deal with international disputes was required. While governments were debating the issues and possibilities for peaceful change and disarmament, activist scholars like Alfred Hermann Fried contributed to creating a public awareness that reflected and supported both the diplomats' and the general public's opposition to war.

"The world has become smaller, human beings bigger and more all-round.
We have become citizens of the world, real world citizens."

—Alfred H. Fried, *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung*, 1905¹

"The largest and most serious question which can be asked today is,
how much farther is the militarism of the civilized world to go? . . . Are
China and Japan to climb to the war-level—perhaps it would be more
true to say descend to the war-level—of England, France, Germany

and Russia? . . . follow the same path, until the ‘armed camp’ of Europe becomes . . . the armed camp of the world?”

—Benjamin Trueblood, *The Federation of the World*, 1899²

INTRODUCTION

The basic principles and purposes of international peace policies were first articulated at the official Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907.³ This initial world order project at The Hague has not received adequate attention, and its major objectives and achievements even appear to have been deliberately brushed aside. Recently, Glenda Sluga, Professor of International History at Sydney University, has paid tribute to and highlighted the unique significance of the Conferences.⁴ These Conferences, to which the Russian Czar Nicholas II and Dutch Queen Wilhelmina had been invited, were in many ways the fruit of the Age of Enlightenment, representing “the legal conscience of the civilized world”;⁵ they were backed by academics, diplomats, peace activists, and heads of state. Among these, Alfred Hermann Fried was an outstanding figure who supported the efforts through his numerous writings and activities, and an important link in an international network of pacifists dedicated to outlawing war. To this writer, his most outstanding contribution was that he recognized the necessity for an organized peace, of which a *transition* from the existing state of “latent war” to an international peace based on justice and order was the most important element. Although Fried died in 1921, his work presents a hermeneutic link connecting the past to the present.

Fried, with Bertha von Suttner, co-founded the German Peace Society. Having been almost forgotten, in 2004 he received renewed attention with a monograph on his life and work,⁶ and in October 2011 an International Symposium on his thought was held in Potsdam, Germany.⁷ This paper explores the history and development of some of the main principles and purposes of the international peace movement with which Fried was associated, at a time when “late nineteenth-century peace thinking increasingly molded itself on scientific and historically verifiable foundations, not merely the claim that war violated Christian principles.”⁸

This paper begins with two propositions. First, through the agency of Alfred Hermann Fried, the Kantian international law concept of a transition period became an important legal principle⁹ that was eventually included in the UN Charter after the Second World War. Today, this idea—moving

from an anarchic to an international system based on the rule of law (or world law)—is an important concept in international relations and legal theory. Second, the major world powers (Great Britain, France, the United States, Russia, and to some degree China), who at The Hague were in favour of binding international jurisdiction, appear to have conscientiously followed up on and consistently pursued and developed the World Order project begun at The Hague by establishing the League of Nations and then the United Nations Organization. Though Fried was not exceptional in fighting for what had become an accepted objective of mainstream pacifism and frequently even an official strand of government peace policy,¹⁰ he was exceptional in that he wanted to get militarist Germany to join the more peace-friendly international environment, and by his example to establish a positive precedent for an effective peace organization including central Europe.

EARLY LIFE AND PEACE CONCEPTS

Alfred Hermann Fried was an Austrian national, born in Vienna into a poor Jewish family and “into the simultaneously polyglot and nationalist rhythm of the Habsburg Empire.”¹¹ Apparently Fried’s horror of war was aroused early on by reports of the Franco-Prussian war, and the 1881 exhibition of the artist Vasily Vereschagin’s works, showing “images of the Russo-Ottoman war theater” (1877 to 1878).¹² He may also have been influenced by the German Social Democrats’ 1891 “Erfurt Program,” which called for the abolition of standing armies and the peaceful resolution of disputes by arbitration.¹³

In November 1891, Fried began corresponding with Suttner, who was already renowned as an activist promoting pacifist ideals; with his own ideas acknowledged and confirmed by the baroness, he now engaged the peace movement in a serious way. In January 1892, inspired by Suttner’s book *Die Waffen nieder! (Lay Down Your Arms!)*,¹⁴ Fried started publishing a monthly magazine by the same title in order to promote disarmament and international organization. Then, together with Suttner, in November 1892 he founded the German Peace Society in Berlin. He also printed a “Peace Catechism,” an introduction to the peace movement which served the movement for a number of years.¹⁵

Fried was probably familiar with Immanuel Kant’s transition concept, expounded in his treatise on *Perpetual Peace*, which proclaimed that “without

a compact between the nations . . . peace cannot be established or assured. Hence, there must be an alliance of a particular kind which we may call a covenant of peace (*foedus pacificum*), which would differ from a treaty of peace (*pactum pacis*) in this respect, that the latter merely puts an end to one war, while the former would seek to put an end to war forever.”¹⁶ Fried commented,

On this idea then was based the rich peace movement of the nineteenth century, with its peace societies, peace congresses, Interparliamentary associations; the two Hague Conferences, with their arbitration agreements, arbitration decisions, disarmament attempts; and the numerous pacifist advances in the parliamentary representatives of both hemispheres, with their immense sociological, international legal and philosophical literature.¹⁷

In his view the trend was obvious and continuous. When the German Association for International Peace Propaganda of 1874 was re-established in 1895, Fried became the first Secretary. The Association’s program outlined the necessary requirements for a lasting, guaranteed peace: a “legal order excluding all wars” that would be achieved by a general “international law treaty” and submission to an “international pacific judiciary to be set up.”¹⁸ Also in 1895, under the pseudonym Manfred Herald Frei, Fried published *Genghis Khan with Telegraphs*, in which he pointed out that while “the domestic order of states [is guaranteed] by successfully stopping anarchy,” in appalling contrast the “unlimited rule of anarchy in the external affairs of those same States that . . . recognize no other law than the law of brute force” reveals a state of war in peace; the current state of a Europe armed to the teeth “meant putting the principle of anarchy into practice.”¹⁹ Obviously, “armaments are a symptom of international anarchy, . . . the substitute for order in the prevailing international disorder”;²⁰ the anarchic nation-state system could never guarantee people’s “freedom from fear.”

As seen in his 1908 booklet, *Grundlagen des revolutionären Pazifismus* (Foundations of Revolutionary Pacifism), Fried realized long before the start of the First World War that “the militarily guaranteed peace perpetuates violence in its latent state.”²¹ This was corroborated by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim who wrote,

Very often there are nations officially at peace with each other who are as a matter of fact in a state of ‘veiled warfare.’ By this

we are to understand that, under an apparent peace, latent war is growling and muttering, and this situation may last for a long time, ‘even for decades.’ It is perfectly evident that many diplomatic stratagems are justified by this state of latent war.²²

In “A Brief Outline of the Nature and Aims of Pacifism,” Fried wrote,

One must discriminate between ‘No War’ and ‘Peace.’ The condition existing at present under normal circumstances between nations is not that of *peace*, as understood by pacifism, but merely that of *no war*. Nor is it the object of the peace movement to bring about that peace which is made after a war. Such peace merely terminates war; it does not found peace.

He illustrated this point with an analogy: a drunkard sober between drinks is not an abstainer.²³

The importance Fried ascribed to international law distinguished him from another pacifist, Ludwig Quidde, who believed ethical considerations had priority before referring to the law. Fried’s action program, however, called for an international law that would constitute the groundwork for the future international organization, including “adaption of the law to the needs of international traffic, the codification of law, development of international private and international law, extension of arbitration,” and “weakening the violence factor.”²⁴ Fried pointed out that the “increasing strengthening of law is evident in that [governments] today, when they use force, seek to preserve the appearance of justice.²⁵

In Germany and beyond, it was significant that Fried’s scientific or “organizational” pacifism found the support of international law professor Walther Schücking, a Neo-Kantian member of parliament and an Interparliamentarian.²⁶ Schücking’s work came to be widely known abroad, especially with the publication of his *The International Union of the Hague Peace Conferences*, translated from the German.²⁷ Later he confessed, “My whole direction in international law has been determined by Fried to a large extent.”²⁸ Fried’s “scientific pacifism” “interpreted rising global interdependence as a force towards international order.”²⁹

THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

Precisely these ideas, namely, the legal aspects of peaceful conflict resolution, disarmament, and creating a world order, which were deemed necessary for humanity’s survival, were on the agenda of the 1989 First Hague Peace

Conference, the “first truly international assembl[y] meeting in time of peace for the purpose of preserving peace, not of concluding a war then in progress.”³⁰ In a 30 August 1898 editorial in the *Berliner Zeitung*, Fried described the event to which the Russian Tsar and the Dutch Queen had been invited:

The idea of peace has made a winning message, a message of victory, like no one had dared to dream. The crowned head of the most powerful European nation holds the banner on which are written the words “Lay Down Your Arms!” . . . [and] in the past 48 hours world history has made an audible yank forward that cannot again be undone . . . All aboard, this is the call; all hands take up the arms of the spirit: “Peace has broken out!”³¹

In addition to disarmament, the aims of the Hague Peace Conference were, in Fried’s view, the “elimination of the *causes* for armaments, the founding of the legal system that is still wanting, and consequently the end of anarchy between states.” Fried wrote, “The conference must more closely examine and get to the bottom of what actually are the causes for the armaments, and finally, if it is serious about doing its work, to follow the only possible and correct way, namely, to advance the legal associations of states with each other and to increase them significantly.”³² For him it was obvious that it was unrealistic to call for disarmament without actually transitioning to an international legal order, including a judiciary with binding powers.

While the conference sessions at The Hague were not open to the public, Fried participated in the opening ceremony with, among others, Suttner, the Englishman William Stead, Theodor Herzl, and some members of the press. His connection with the Polish-Russian Councillor Jan Bloch, whose treatise on the future of war had influenced the Tsar³³ and who was present in The Hague, brought Fried material support for his publications, including the *Friedens-Warte*. Japanese-born historian Cyril H. Powles called Bloch’s book “a veritable *Das Kapital* of pacifism.”³⁴ Here at The Hague Fried also met the French diplomat and pacifist Paul Henri (Baron) d’Estournelles de Constant for the first time. Although the conference would last until July 29, Fried left The Hague on June 2 after the international law project of obligatory arbitration had failed due to the German veto.

In spite of that, in his newly-published weekly for international understanding, *Die Friedens-Warte*, Fried encouraged pacifists by saying that at this first government-organized international peace conference, “diplomats

of both worlds [i.e., the European/American and the Asian world] co-operated”; war was, for the first time, “unanimously condemned in principle by the vast majority”; and “the arbitration principle recognized for the first time by the great majority of the nations of the world,” although regretfully “for the time being in a limited way only.” Further, “concerning the huge burden of armaments, this unsatisfactory state of affairs was for the first time officially admitted.”³⁵ Fried followed this in 1900 with an eighty-page book titled *The Hague Peace Conference*, in which he praised the conference as a “victory of progress,” and “the beginning of a system” that was changing international politics “from the theory of violent conflict resolution to the legal point of view.”³⁶

EUROPE AND THE WORLD

There was a significant shift in Fried’s perception of Europe’s role with regard to achieving world peace before the First World War and after. Before the war, he thought of peace as emanating from Europe and inspired by European peace plans; in this, he seemed to give some room even to an enlightened colonialism:

We are content with a union of European states for a definite purpose, with a real business contract, a company with limited liability for the opening up of China, the opening up of Africa and God knows what other undeveloped lands. . . . An international fleet operating with a European mandate will get the business done much more peacefully and a Congress of the European Nations, the Supervisory Board of this great partnership, will guide and govern the activities.³⁷

After the war, however, he recognized the global context as the only effective frame of reference and a precondition for a secure peace. In his 1919 book on the League of Nations, Fried wrote, “I had previously proposed as the basis for the organization of peace a Zweckverband Europe. But the World War taught us that international relations (*Weltzusammenhänge*) already are so strong that the organization of *one* continent alone is no longer realistic.”³⁸ Anticipating some of Hedley Bull’s later ideas, Fried considered the “transition from a European to a global international society” to be “the most important development.”³⁹

Fried’s earlier proposal found enthusiastic reception at the 1909 General Assembly of the International Peace Bureau,⁴⁰ which called for the

establishment of a “pan-European Bureau” modeled along the lines of the Pan-American movement.⁴¹ John Barrett, the director of the Pan-American Bureau, reported, “If there had been long established in one of the capitals of Europe, like London, Paris, Berlin, or Vienna, a Pan-European Union, organized on the same basis and for the same purpose and controlled in the same way as the Pan-American Union in Washington, *there never would have been a European war.*”⁴² Such a Pan-European Union, Fried thought, “would finally develop into a World-Union (*Weltzweckverband*).”⁴³ Although the pan-European office did not materialize, Fried stuck to his idea, and now called his project a “Zweckverband Europa” (Cooperative Union of Europe). For this he approached the *Reichsregierung* (German imperial government), asking it to take up the issue in a positive spirit, convinced that the chances for creating such an association were favourable: “We are facing a decisive turn in European politics. If the Anglo-German understanding comes about, Europe will be ripe and ready for cooperation, and peace permanently secured on the continent. . . . This would be a worthy task for the German Reich, the fulfillment of which could bring the German people more success than a victorious war.”⁴⁴ This Anglo-German understanding was the *sine qua non* of maintaining peace in Europe.⁴⁵ The headquarters of the “Bureau” were to be in Berlin, “which would thereby advance from being the imperial capital to becoming the capital of Europe.”⁴⁶ In addition to the European Union, various regional organizations in other parts of the world would likewise take their place in the larger scheme of things and support the world order. It is a sad chapter of German history that Germany with its narrower attitude manoeuvered itself to the sidelines and finally into the Nazi cataclysm.

Since Fried’s efforts to become a naturalized German citizen failed, he left Berlin in 1903 after almost two decades in the capital and returned to Vienna, where he now moved increasingly “into Bertha von Suttner’s personal orbit.”⁴⁷ That same year he joined the “Institut international de la Paix” which was supported by the Monegasque king, and where international lawyers like Carl Ludwig von Bar (1836-1913), judges at the Hague Court of Arbitration, Inter-Parliamentarians, and pacifists came together.⁴⁸ In 1905, he published the first edition of his famous *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (Manual of the Peace Movement). This reference book was meant to serve both “outsiders . . . as . . . an Almanac” and “followers and the initiated” as material for their peace activities.⁴⁹ The *Handbuch* also paid tribute to the work begun at The Hague, which had “crowned the pacifist

efforts of decades” and had led states increasingly to discard the concept of maintaining peace by military means in favour of “the pacifist view of peacekeeping by expanding and consolidating international law.”⁵⁰

THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE

Like the first one, the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 was disappointing due to the relatively meagre results achieved, in spite of the unexpectedly long time for which it was convened. In vain the Americans endeavoured to bring about a majority decision on the issue of compulsory arbitration, which would safely have been achieved at the third conference planned for 1914-15. Since the American delegation failed to bring about a majority vote, it abstained, giving the following argument:

The Conference was unable to agree upon a general treaty of arbitration, although a large majority expressed itself in favor. . . . The majority felt that it was desirable to conclude at The Hague a general arbitration treaty binding those who were willing to be bound, without seeking, directly or indirectly, to coerce the minority, which was unwilling to bind itself. The minority, however, refused to permit the majority to conclude such a treaty, invoking the principle of unanimity or substantial unanimity for all conventions concluded at The Hague. . . . The friends of arbitration were bitterly disappointed and the American delegation abstained from voting on the declaration; first, because it seemed to be an inadmissible retreat from the advanced position secured by a vote of four to one in favor of the arbitration convention [obtained previously], and, second, lest an affirmative vote be construed to indicate both an approval of the arguments or methods of the minority as well as of the withdrawal of the proposed treaty.⁵¹

Nevertheless, US delegates like the pacifist American lawyer and statesman Elihu Root stated that it was not just about what the conference had been able to achieve, but

what it has begun, and what it has moved forward. Not only the conventions signed and ratified, but the steps taken toward conclusions which may not reach practical and effective form for many years to come, are of value. Some of the resolutions adopted by the last conference do not seem to amount to

very much by themselves, but each one marks on some line of progress the farthest point to which the world is yet willing to go. They are like cable ends buoyed in mid-ocean, to be picked up hereafter by some other steamer, spliced, and continued to shore. The greater the reform proposed, the longer must be the process required to bring many nations differing widely in their laws, customs, traditions, interests, prejudices, into agreement. Each necessary step in the process is as useful as the final act which crowns the work and is received with public celebration.⁵²

Fried's understanding was similar to Root's: "The organization of humanity has been going on for a long time. It grows from day to day; at a thousand locations work is going on toward this end at the same time. The legal development of international traffic is only part of this work and the Hague Conferences are only a part of this." The main reason for the lack of substantial progress, in his view, was the unwillingness of some states, Germany in particular, to renounce "the dogma of unlimited sovereignty."⁵³

In contrast, the Pan-American movement had gained in significance, with the South American States participating at the Hague Conference for the first time in 1907. In the second edition of his *Pan-Amerika* (1918), Fried pointed out the war's negative effects on Europe: "While this colossal breakdown takes place on the soil of Europe's old culture, on the other side of the world, the community of nations grounded in Pan-Americanism grows to an ever stronger organization that is increasingly becoming aware of its importance."⁵⁴ Europe, in Fried's opinion, would be well advised to recognize and assimilate these pan-American developments in regional organization, which were relevant for the future development of the international legal order.

In the preface to the 1910 first edition of *Pan-Amerika*, Fried had written about the "very different way states live side by side and coexist," an issue debated at The Hague:

From false premises you come to false conclusions, and false conclusions are always a danger for those whose actions depend on it. There is therefore an American danger; but only insofar as in Europe one overlooks or fails to recognize the suggestions coming from there, is not looking to adapt, and thereby adheres to a backwardness that must be to the detriment of the old continent, but for which one has oneself to blame. The American

threat has its starting point in Europe.⁵⁵

The task for the pacifists was to show and explain the actual substance of their vision and how it would evolve democratically. In the autumn of 1905, in a remarkable essay published in the *Friedens-Warte*, Fried explained his “system of revolutionary pacifism.” Expanding on this in *Die Grundlagen des revolutionären Pazifismus* (1908), he explained the transition from the “anarchy of international relations that of necessity produces violence as a regulator,” to a state of order of “the international coexistence of nations.”⁵⁶ His pacifism was revolutionary in the sense of a “change of principle,” aimed only at eliminating the causes of the disorderly, anarchical relations between states, not in the sense of toppling the existing order which remained the basis of all future development. Hedley Bull, though not referring to Fried, similarly conceived “of changes in the present political structure of the world . . . that would be quite basic, yet nevertheless would represent simply a transition from one phase of the states system to another, not the suppression of the states system itself.”⁵⁷

Fried distinguished between “revolutionary pacifism and reform pacifism,” and emphasized that the revolutionary solution consisted in addressing “not the method but the nature of the change.”⁵⁸ It was not enough to merely denounce and “protest against the symptoms” that resulted from the present international system. Reform pacifism merely objected to “war as an outward manifestation,” and tried to remove its “evil consequences,”⁵⁹ such as the arms race and excess military expenditures. Revolutionary pacifism, in contrast, sought to address the causes of war. In this way, “peace” would be given an entirely new meaning. Like the pacifist and medical practitioner Georg Friedrich Nicolai,⁶⁰ Fried found a parallel in the history of medicine which for a long time merely treated symptoms without addressing the causes of the disease.⁶¹ “It was recognized that what caused the disease was merely the poor state of the organism, and thus the process was initiated to stabilize the organism.”⁶²

Fried’s utilitarian approach was grounded in international law, and here he found a counterpart in a “long-time friend and correspondent,” Jacques Novicow, whose book, *The Federation of Europe*, he had translated in 1901. In general, Fried’s work had a long-term impact that subtly complemented and contributed to shaping the current plans for the future world organization. The trend within both the academic and the political peace movement was clear. It was within the Kantian tradition that political scientist Quincy

Wright could write in 1942, “After the fighting is over and aggression has been suppressed, a period of reconstruction will be necessary to establish an order more adequate than the ‘peace’ which preceded and produced the hostilities. *The problem is not to restore to an earlier situation but to build a more adequate world order.*”⁶³ With regard to World War I, Fried put it as follows: “The present war is the logical outcome of the kind of ‘peace’ that preceded it . . . Formerly when war came to an end, the warring nations entered upon a real peace.”⁶⁴ The accumulated knowledge provided by this kind of research was the substance for the American government’s substantial input into the post-World War II new world organization, the United Nations.⁶⁵

Fried never doubted that the advance to a progressively more inclusive, all-encompassing global unity was imperative:

Humanity is, without actually knowing it, playing an active part in [bringing about] the world organization. The world organizing process is nothing but the sum of all cultural work brought about by mankind, the sum of the forces emanating from peoples’ groups, states, and national associations. . . . Contemporaries still overlook one thing: what the sum of their individual achievements amounts to is not a mere addition of these achievements, but something much higher.⁶⁶

Clinging to outdated political concepts—in particular the right to unrestrained sovereign power—had blocked progress, progress that policymakers in Germany were unwilling to recognize, although in fact rules had already evolved whereby “the sovereignty of states, by a natural process, became more and more restricted.”⁶⁷ Under international law, as Fried explained in his *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung*, each treaty already implied the “giving up of a piece of national sovereignty in favor of one’s own advantage.” In this way, each single nation, by “limiting its sovereignty, can only reap benefits.”⁶⁸ His argument is relevant even today:

The inert accumulation of power of the state brings benefits only if you make it fluid so as to collect valuable interest in the form of obligations of other states. It would be the task of a farsighted and modern-thinking diplomacy, continuously and extensively to transform this accumulated power into the other state’s obligations and so to secure one’s own state the biggest advantage of its power.⁶⁹

Fried wrote further,

It is strange if in particular German international lawyers and politicians proclaim the inviolability of state sovereignty and in so doing completely overlook the fact that the German Empire would not be possible if the individual states that it was composed of would not have sacrificed some of their sovereignty. . . . They have, by restricting their individual sovereignty, in exchange attained much greater safety, and a higher degree of wealth and prosperity.⁷⁰

For Fried, the giving up of sovereign powers to a wider authority, as stipulated after World War II in the French Constitution and numerous other European and also some non-European constitutions, was of the highest relevance for national security, prosperity, and peace.⁷¹ Sovereignty, he explained, “does not imply immovability.” In today’s world, “no state could exist for an hour without reciprocal limitations,” but “modern diplomats” use “sovereignty as a bulwark behind which they hide when there is no rational justification for their actions.”⁷²

Fried thought that even the French government was open to embrace the pacifists’ objectives. He had worked together with French pacifists for the organization of peace, and he saw this as propitious for the future, saying, “In France we see pacifism at the helm of government.”⁷³ Fried would have favored the Inter-Parliamentary Union initiative in 1924 to revise constitutions and write peace clauses into national constitutions to outlaw war.⁷⁴ The relinquishment of the sovereign right to go to war was to become a democratic tool to achieve world order and initiate the process toward the emergence of a supranational regulatory power.

ACHIEVING AN ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

The key to enable the emergence of an effective organization of peace, as Fried perceived it, was the “translation of one’s own powers into the others’ duties.” This, he said, was “the formula of the intergovernmental organization,” and it “differs significantly from the formula of the militaristic ‘*Si vis pacem para bellum*’ (If you want peace, prepare for war).”⁷⁵

The organization of the living relations of States, however, must eliminate the anarchist idea that every nation has the right to the free living out (*Ausleben*) [of its ambitions], even at the expense of the living conditions of all others. This new self-restraint of the powerful, however, will yield actual returns according to the principle underlying the organization: exchange of

one's own power for foreign obligations.⁷⁶

The inadequacy of military peacekeeping becomes obvious when one realizes that security under this condition can only be achieved if every state is “always as strong as to be able to withstand all the others.”⁷⁷ Today, clearly, peace cannot be secured by any one nation that would be as strong as everyone else together. As Fried put it, the effective force of a “regulatory center” is required to “make unproductive efforts redundant” and “remove dead resistance.” Thereby, “crude power changes into regulated power; might becomes right.” So, “attempts to humanize war are futile because they are self-contradictory. War suspends morality, and cannot be regulated.”⁷⁸ According to Fried, “right” is “nothing more than transformed violence.” The envisaged international organization does not mean the “removal of force, but only the regulation of force.”⁷⁹ Sandi Cooper has traced the history of the “efforts to organize peace societies nationally and a movement internationally” prior to and after “the imposed peace of 1871” that emerged from the Prusso-French War.⁸⁰ Wrote Fried, “Thus Organization signifies an increase in the quality of life; anarchy is the opposite; . . . what we call history is nothing but an ongoing organizational process, a forever progressing transformation and regulation of the component forces, an increasingly progressive transformation of brute force into law.”⁸¹ Fried did not, however, want to lay out what form this regulatory, peacekeeping power should assume as an organization, since this could only be the result of a natural and due process. To “proclaim the world organization,” one must recognize “that in large parts it already exists . . . and that the thinking man needs only to put the finishing touches to this huge structure . . . to give the whole a uniform facade. You may call this facade whatever you like: United States, Federation, Empire, *organization* must be its essence.”⁸² Fried biographer Petra Schönemann-Behrens comments, “The important thing about this *realpolitical* orientation is the *process character* of the envisaged peace order, and its dynamic components that already anticipated contemporary definitions.”⁸³

There are arguments for and against world government. Johan Galtung discusses the question in *Peace by Peaceful Means*, in the chapter entitled “The State System: Dissociative, Associative, Confederational, Federal, Unitary—or a Lost Case?”⁸⁴ In an earlier work, he writes that “some kind of world-state is bound to come about . . . because of the problems and conflicts brought about through the contradiction between the expansion of man and the finiteness of nature.”⁸⁵ In any case, it is important to envisage and realize the

democratic process of the transition that involves the peace movement and civil society, and to assure their engaged, combined efforts to determine the outcome. In *Grundlagen des revolutionären Pazifismus*, Fried noted that the interests of every civilized nation today already lay “far beyond the demarcations of the individual state.”⁸⁶ The “final goal” to bring about a “federation among the civilized states of the world”⁸⁷ was held not only by German pacifists, but also by the Americans and progressive forces in other parts of the world.

Lacking knowledge of the true evolution of international relations, of the interdependence and common interests of all members of the international society, every nation acts in the basic direction of its activity as if it stood alone in the world, as if no relations connected it with the rest of the community of nations. So as its final *raison d'être* it feels compelled to rely upon its own power, to assert itself by force, which, in light of the naturally progressing enlargement of interest groups and the increased difficulties associated with asserting one's existence, must in due course only lead to a proliferation and escalation of conflicts. In this state of affairs every people of every nation must be the enemy of every other, each progress means the other peoples' loss, and one nation's welfare means the other people's misfortune.⁸⁸

Surprisingly, Fried said that therefore war may still be necessary since it can “be liberating and . . . reasonable, as long as the conditions that brought it about are unreasonable.”⁸⁹

From January 1906 onwards, the *Friedens-Warte*, “on the whole, the most substantial and effective of the publications devoted to peace and arbitration,”⁹⁰ replaced its motto “Lay Down Your Arms!” with the slogan “Organize the World!” and an emblem representing interlocking gears. Fried now described pacifists as “peace-engineers.” The journal was delivered to “all German and Austrian parliamentarians and Reichstag deputies, 490 university professors, outstanding personalities in America and England, and all the diplomats in European capitals.”⁹¹ Beginning in 1912, the journal received an annual subsidy of six thousand dollars from the Carnegie Foundation and thus became “the highest funded peace journal by subsidy from the Carnegie Foundation worldwide.”⁹²

It is not surprising that Fried's efforts received high recognition from

academics. Cambridge University International Law Professor Lassa Oppenheim acknowledged that Fried had put pacifism “on a scientific basis.” Not only that, he had “founded the . . . science of ‘Internationalism’ and . . . by his arguments compelled most representatives of the science of international law to become his followers in the pursuit of the Ideal of Permanent Peace.”⁹³ Bertha von Suttner acknowledged that Fried was in his time “the only one we have in Central Europe, who keeps pacifism alive and represents it as a publicist.”⁹⁴

Roger Chickering is more critical of Fried and seems to view him with some disdain and perhaps incredulity:

Fried attempted to portray pacifism as the logical, indeed inevitable, outgrowth of internationalization. The results were not altogether convincing, but he did succeed in adducing a body of observable evidence on which to base his assertions. He also provided pacifism with a coherent sociological theory and philosophy of history, which were more credible and admitted of more dispassionate consideration than Bertha von Suttner’s raptures. Largely as a result of Fried’s recasting the credo, pacifism began to receive favorable attention in wider sectors of German society, among groups that had also been impressed by the process of internationalization and were inclined to draw at least some of the same political consequences that the pacifists foresaw. It was thus testimony to Fried that the German peace movement came to comprise more than just the pacifists in the German Peace Society.⁹⁵

By 1908, Fried was famous and could boast of publication in nearly one hundred newspapers in Germany and abroad. Of his over 1000 articles, 350 were wholly dedicated to the Hague Peace Conferences.⁹⁶ By the time he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911 (together with Dutch legal scholar Tobias Asser), Fried had become one of the world’s most important and widely read publicists on peace issues—in all, a highly respected pacifist in possession of an outstanding scientific reputation. His “brilliant treatises,” Schücking wrote to the Nobel Institute in Kristiania, “especially the splendidly managed *Friedens-Warte*, have essentially won over the majority of the German international law authorities to the pacifist teachings.”⁹⁷

In connection with the 1913 opening of the Peace Palace in The Hague, Leiden University awarded Fried with an honorary doctorate in

political science. In his address on receiving the honour, the Nobel Peace laureate declared that human history was now witnessing “the advent of a new science.”⁹⁸ It was obvious that the just-completed Peace Palace was slated to become the hub of the planned third Hague Peace Conference that was destined to outlaw war.

From 1909 onwards, Fried continuously and intensively engaged in exploring and sketching out the intellectual foundations for establishing a society for international cooperation. This important initiative, which Fried thought should become the “upper house of the peace movement,”⁹⁹ was finally realized in 1911 by the Association for International Understanding, founded by the German-Swiss pacifist Otfried Nippold and Schücking. By that time, however, the coming war cast a dark shadow over Europe, threatening the peace *and* the peace movement.

THE SHADOW OF WAR

The outbreak of World War I was traumatic for Fried. He asked, “Why should the world-state, that is, the political adaptation of all the nations to the world-tendency toward interdependence, be created by that most impractical method, subjugation?”¹⁰⁰ In a letter of 14 October 1912 to Japanese pacifist lawyer Tannejiro Miyaoka, he wrote,

We are here confronted with the war in the Balkans and fear of a general European conflagration. Even before the war broke out, on the stock exchange in the European capitals billions were lost. You must have felt the repercussions yourself in your country. Here in Austria the ruthless military government has exploited the fear of war prevailing among the public to recently demand two hundred million for armaments.¹⁰¹

In another letter dated 28 November 1912, Fried complained about the “typical European paranoia” that had provoked the crisis.¹⁰²

In order to influence the course of things positively, and achieve a breakthrough for the new discipline of the international law of peace, Fried and Suttner planned a great World Peace Congress for 1914 to be held in the palace of the Austrian Parliament in Vienna.¹⁰³ But when Suttner died suddenly on June 21, that splendid Congress became a memorial service. Only two days later, with the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, the World Peace Congress—quite possibly the largest non-governmental peace assembly ever, both in number of participants and importance—was

cancelled. Four months earlier in February, Suttner had written in her diary: “The newspaper war between Austria and Russia is already in full swing. Perhaps war will break out and make the Congress impossible.”¹⁰⁴

Fried was now increasingly subject to personal attacks in his home country, and he moved “temporarily,” as he first assumed, to Switzerland. Together with Schücking and Nippold, he wanted to “take the initial steps” to prepare for the peace conference, which was expected shortly, since the war was to end soon.¹⁰⁵

The peace conference was to bring about “a total revision of the political foundations of modern Europe.”¹⁰⁶ In a 1915 publication, Fried described the anticipated process to establish a “completely new form”¹⁰⁷ of international relations after the war, aiming at a system that would replace the armed peace that created the conditions of latent war with a transnational system of peaceful coexistence. Other organizations supported his ideas. In January 1915, the Council of the International Peace Bureau in Bern issued an Appeal “to the Peace Societies of all countries” calling, among other things, for “the creation of an international organization of states with common permanent representation, including a permanent international judiciary, . . . parliamentary control of foreign policy, . . . prohibition of all offense and defense alliances, . . . opening to trade of all the colonies, . . . [and] protection of the native population in the colonies.”¹⁰⁸ The Swiss Committee for the Study of the Foundations for a Permanent Peace Treaty and the Dutch Anti-War Council (*Anti-Oorlog-Raad*) made similar demands.

Fried complained that “the perception that peace could be protected by weaponry” was still the rule,¹⁰⁹ and the outdated principle, “*si vis pacem, para bellum*,” still applied. In an August 1916 letter to Prince Alexander von Hohenlohe, he suggested that they should appeal together to the government of the German Reich to “relinquish its annexations,” adopt “a statute for the organization of Europe to prevent future wars,” and take measures for the reduction of armaments.¹¹⁰ Although Hohenlohe sympathized with Fried, he considered the plan to be not very promising, and suggested that the newly established German Association for Lasting Peace and International Understanding take up the task. Nevertheless, the Swiss National Council agreed to elicit with Hohenlohe “the position of the Reich’s government to a mediation attempt by the neutrals.” With Fried’s assistance, Hohenlohe did indeed “apply through an intermediary to the Reichs-Chancellor to inform

him of the plans of the neutrals.”¹¹¹ The government, however, bent on final victory (*Endsieg*), showed little interest in international legal organization and insisted that Germany “had only taken up arms to defend its freedom and independence.”¹¹² Although efforts for a negotiated peace were unsuccessful, after the Russian February Revolution and the April 1917 US entry into the war, there were further mediation attempts in which Fried also actively participated.

A little more than two months earlier, on 22 January 1917, US President Woodrow Wilson had, in an address to the Senate, appealed for an end to the war and a negotiated “peace without victory,” and had offered to participate and help bring about a “League of Peace”; however, this did not impress the German government. One year later, on 8 January 1918, Wilson introduced his Fourteen Points program, once more presenting Germany the chance of a negotiated peace, but to no avail. Fried complained in his contribution to the 1919 Eighth German Pacifist Congress that “because of the doings of the German *jusqu’aboutiste* politicians and annexationists . . . the point in time had been missed, which would have allowed the German people to conclude a true pacifist peace of understanding and compromise, a peace in which there would have been no winner or loser.”¹¹³ The German leadership, however, with an allusion to the *Nibelungenlied*’s epic hero Siegfried, wanted nothing less than a *Siegfrieden* (a peace of victory); a negotiated peace was unacceptable. This in turn led to the double “*Dolchstoss* legend” (stab-in-the-back thesis), alleging that domestically the pacifists had betrayed German interests, while Germany was also stabbed by its enemies from the outside; this was soon “believed by much of the German population.”¹¹⁴

With the signing of the armistice, developments took a turn for the worse. Fried lamented, “The war has ended only in theory; it continues to rage in more terrible violence than before. Let us not deceive ourselves; the worst is yet come.”¹¹⁵

Fried perceived the failure of Wilson’s ideas, as expressed in his Fourteen Points, as the “defeat of the better part of humanity.”¹¹⁶ Like the US Congress some time later, Fried did not approve of the Treaty of Versailles. The reasons for rejecting the agreement were similar, namely, that it “did not go far enough toward supranational government,” as the American peace historian Charles Chatfield put it.¹¹⁷

Fried did not recognize the League of Nations Covenant as a breakthrough in the sense of having achieved a firm foundation for an international

peace based on justice and order, guaranteeing an organized peace. On the question of war guilt, he confessed,

I am of the opinion that the war was triggered by the leaders of the German political elite, so that therefore, the blame for this human disaster lies on the German side. Not the German people as a whole bear this guilt, but the German government, and with it some irresponsible circles, who exercised their pernicious influence on the government. It is true that all the nations had made preparations for the war for decades; but it is equally true that Europeans had also been successful in settling violent conflicts peacefully, and that all civilized governments were striving to bring about a significant change in this unsustainable system of anarchy.¹¹⁸

In Fried's opinion, a guilty plea was necessary because the "German people were by and large innocent," and only in this way a "thick line can be drawn between modern Germany and the old autocratic, militarist Germany." How else, he asked, could it "regain the trust of the world," which the German people "deserve and need to restore normal life?"¹¹⁹

In *Der Weltprotest gegen den Versailler Frieden* (World Protest against the Peace of Versailles) (1920), Fried once more called for a "peace based on law" instead of armaments; the "key" toward this end was to "break with all things of the past."¹²⁰ Support for Fried's ideas on the organization of peace came from both Europe and the United States.¹²¹ A translation of his *Europäische Wiederherstellung* (1915) under the title *The Restoration of Europe* was published in 1916 by Macmillan Company in New York. In it, Fried stated,

I think it important to look forward to *two separate conferences*, the first to attend to *the cessation of hostilities* by a so-called 'treaty of peace', the second to guarantee a genuine peace for the future by *the foundation of a new . . . international organization*. . . . It will be only a beginning, a mere foundation. Its extension will be the unremitting task of decades.¹²²

A *New York Times* article of 2 July 1916 titled "Co-operative Union of Europe, After War I" reported approvingly on Fried's ideas: "He believes . . . that this war must bring not one but two treaties of peace, the first to mark the cessation of actual fighting, the second to lay the groundwork for that union which is destined to stamp out war forever."

In the League of Nations, in spite of its shortcomings, an important legal development was the idea of a world executive, that is, a system of collective security that should, in addition to the peaceful settlement of disputes and disarmament, guarantee the enforcement of the law in peace. The principle of collective security, which had not yet played a role at The Hague, had become part of the Covenant. Fried commented in a 1919 essay,

So now, the prevailing doctrine is to bolster the institutions of good offices, mediation, and arbitration, which in previous legal practice had been optional, and make the use of these institutions a binding duty. The obligation is to be enforced by an Association of Nations, which promises united action against any state that has not, before it proceeds to war, made use of these institutions established by the League for maintaining peace. . . . Thus the nature of violent force is fundamentally changed.¹²³

Fried saw the emergence of an international executive—already on the agenda of the August 1913 twentieth World Peace Congress in The Hague—as generally positive.¹²⁴ An international executive would undoubtedly also have been on the agenda of the third Hague Conference. Fried wrote,

A fight against the offender will not be war; the public force majeur will only be applied by the executive power of an existing law; here it is no longer the question of settling a dispute by the might of the stronger, (or) to create by force a law ex post facto, but to execute an existing right already created by free agreement. That no more means putting brute force in place of law, but to place it in the service of the law; this is no longer war, but an act of justice.¹²⁵

Similarly, Quincy Wright, in his “Political Conditions of the Period of Transition,” argued,

When European hostilities broke out in September, 1939 . . . States . . . came to recognize that under the [Kellogg-Briand] Pact these hostilities could not be characterized as war in the sense formally understood by international law. Rather a condition existed during which violence by certain governments in violation of international obligations was being opposed by other governments . . . acting as a police force to suppress assaults on basic principles of international order.¹²⁶

Although some of the countries represented did not expressly favour an international police force, “trusting that the moral and legal consciousness of today’s world” would generate “enough power to enforce legal decisions” (“the English-speaking nations in particular seemed to take this position”), Fried was—like Schücking, Dutch diplomat Cornelis van Vollenhoven, and others—of the opinion that the institution of an international police, which, he argued, had already proven its worth in several cases, was inevitable.¹²⁷ The cases Fried was referring to were the China Expedition (1900-01), on the occasion of the Boxer Uprising; the efforts by France, Russia, and the United Kingdom in 1898 to attain Crete’s autonomy (though still under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire); and the Skutari Detachment of the Albania Mission in the Balkan Wars, 1913-14. The French diplomat, 1909 Nobel Peace laureate and friend of Fried’s, Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, also saw the China Expedition as a chance for the “beginning of a permanently organized union.”¹²⁸

The groundwork for the international union that was “destined to stamp out war forever” had not yet been laid sufficiently, and the political reality, instead of reinforcing the principle of the superiority of law over brute force, once more tended in the direction of what Fried perceived as a “militarist renaissance.”¹²⁹ The basic idea—that a temporary truce after hostilities have ended is inadequate, and that a transitional period would lead to an unarmed peace based on binding legal arrangements—could not be realized. Although it did become part of international law after the Second World War, this remains a principle that awaits implementation.

Today the history, development, and implementation of ad hoc peace-keeping operations, sanctioned by the UN, are testimony to the usefulness and feasibility of international police action.¹³⁰ However, since peacekeeping operations are based on special agreements outside the UN Charter and depend on military contributions from member states, this agency unintentionally perpetuates the existence of competing national military institutions and thus hinders the realization of an unarmed, positive peace, which the UN Charter envisions.¹³¹

Given the fact that the ideas of pacifism and the efforts of international lawyers, diplomats, and governments were unsuccessful in bringing about a global, legally binding peace based on justice and order in the twentieth century, the question arises today whether and how these visions can be realized. In the wake of World War II, the idea of a “peace science,” which

Fried had always advocated, has to a considerable extent become a reality. Surprisingly, even “after a hundred years,” Fried’s biographer writes, “many of the discussions that the pacifists had at the time have still lost none of their topicality,”¹³² and many peace researchers today see in Fried a great predecessor. However, it is even more surprising that the institution of war a hundred years on is not only not abolished, it is still recognized and upheld by the majority of nation-states. Fried’s notion of a natural and necessary “transition to the rule of law,”¹³³ only much later stipulated in the UN Charter as a new international legal principle, is paid too little attention, even in the peace movement, especially at a time when severe environmental problems also require enforceable solutions.

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65. That the victorious powers did indeed conscientiously and deliberately follow up on the world order project they had supported at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 is evidenced mainly by three features that were new and an improvement compared to the League of Nations: (1) The International Court, which had been an institution separate from and outside the League Covenant, was integrated into the UN Charter; (2) the Security Council, which in League times was a tightly closed and aloof body, opened itself to member states, who were supposed to "confer primary responsibility" for its "prompt and effective action"; and (3) the "Transitional Security Arrangements" provided for a pathway to achieve disarmament and genuine collective security.
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88. Fried, *Die Grundlagen des revolutionären Pazifismus*, 7.
89. Fried, *Die Grundlagen des revolutionären Pazifismus*, 7-8.
90. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Yearbook for 1911* (Washington, DC, 1912), 57; Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 195.
91. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 195.
92. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 195.
93. Quoted in Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 197.
94. Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 485.
95. Chickering, *Imperial Germany and a World without War*, 122.
96. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 193.
97. Quoted in Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 197.
98. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 208.
99. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 218.
100. Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*, 28.
101. Fried Papers, Box 70, General Correspondence 1903-1914, MIYAKO, Tannejiro (1911-1914), Geneva, 1912, Leaf 10133. I thank Professor Peter van den Dungen for arranging for Mr. Jacques Oberson of the League of Nations Archive to digitize and send me the complete Fried-Miyaoka Correspondence in the Archive of the League of Nations Library of the United Nations in Geneva.
102. Fried Papers, 1912, Leaf 10155.

103. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 222-26.
104. Quoted in Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*, 152.
105. Alfred H. Fried, *Mein Kriegstagebuch* (My War Diary), vol. I, *Das erste Kriegsjahr* (The First Year of the War) (Zürich: Max Rascher, 1918), 138; Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 232.
106. Fried to Ludwig Quidde, 24 August 1914, Nachlass (NL) Fried, Box 77, quoted in Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 241.
107. Alfred H. Fried, *Europäische Wiederherstellung* (European Restoration) (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1915), 76.
108. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 243.
109. Alfred H. Fried, “Das alte und das neue System der Friedenssicherung (The Old and the New System of Peacekeeping),” in *Vom Weltkrieg zum Weltfrieden. Zwanzig Kriegsaufsätze* (From World War to World Peace: Twenty War Essays) (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1916), 54.
110. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 256.
111. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 266-67.
112. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 270.
113. Alfred H. Fried, “Sonderschreiben von Alfred H. Fried an den Achten Deutschen Friedenkongreß” (Special report by Alfred H. Fried to the Eighth German Peace Congress), in *Achter Deutscher Pazifistenkongreß einberufen von der Deutschen Friedensgesellschaft und der Zentralstelle Völkerrecht* (Charlottenburg, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte m.b.H, 1919), 165-66.
114. The German leadership was composed of the Great Headquarters (*Große Hauptquartier*) and the Supreme Army Command (*Oberste Heeresleitung*). Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 283.
115. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 280.
116. Fried, *Mein Kriegstagebuch* (My War Diary), vol. IV, *Das vierte Kriegsjahr und der Friede von Versailles* (The Fourth Year of the War and the Peace of Versailles) (Zürich: Max Rascher, 1920), 397.
117. Charles Chatfield, ed., *Peace Movements in America* (New York: Schocken, 1973), xvi-xvii.

118. Fried, "Sonderschreiben," 169.
119. Fried, "Sonderschreiben," 171.
120. Fried, ed., *Der Weltprotest gegen den Versailler Frieden* (The World Protest against the Versailles Peace) (Leipzig: Der neue Geist, 1920); Schönemann-Behrens, "Organisiert die Welt!" 286.
121. Most of Fried's estate ended up in the United States. Because of economic difficulties, Fried's widow Therese sold his extensive library to the Hoover War Library at Stanford University in California. The pacifist scholar Hans Wehberg welcomed this, saying that in this way the books would be made available to the American people, "in whom a deep desire for justice lives"; thus the Americans would be put in the position "to realize Fried's great importance" and make use of his findings. *Die Friedens-Warte* 24, no. 12 (December 1924): 333-34.
122. Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*, 97, 101.
123. Fried, "Die Grundlagen der zukünftigen Völkerorganisation," 399.
124. For a recent appraisal of the idea of collective security and the general public's hope for collective security in the interwar period expressed by "world opinon," see Cherri Wemlinger, "Collective Security and the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute Before the League of Nations," *Peace & Change* 40, no. 2 (2015): 139-66.
125. Fried, *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung*, 22.
126. Wright, "Political Conditions of the Period of Transition," 265.
127. Elisabeth Friedrichs, "Der XX. Weltfriedenskongreß im Haag, 18. bis 23. August 1913 (The Twentieth World Peace Congress in The Hague, 18 to 23 August 1913); *Friedens-Warte* 15 (August 1913): 331.
128. Adolf Wild, *Baron d'Estournelles de Constant (1852-1924). Das Wirken eines Friedensnobelpreisträgers für die deutsch-französische Verständigung und europäische Einigung* (Baron d'Estournelles de Constant (1852-1924); The Work of a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate for Franco-German Understanding and European Integration) (Hamburg: Fundament Verlag Dr. Sasse, 1973), 108.
129. Alfred H. Fried, *Auf hartem Grund. Offene Antwort auf den an mich gerichteten offenen Brief von Dr. jur. Hermann M. Popert im "Vortrapp"*

vom 1. März 1919 (On Hard Ground: Open Response to the Open Letter Addressed to Me by Dr. Jur. Hermann M. Popert in the *Vanguard* of 1 March 1919) (Hamburg: Pfadweiser, 1919), 19, 22; Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 290.

130. Karlheinz Koppe, “Wenn Soldaten Polizisten werden (If Soldiers Became Policemen),” *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 11 (2001): 1295-97.
131. Klaus Schlichtmann, “UN Collective Security and the Transitional Period: A Myth over the Founding and Aims of the United Nations,” *Journal of East Asia and International Law* 3, no. 1 (2010): 99-122.
132. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 12.
133. Schönemann-Behrens, “Organisiert die Welt!,” 203, n. 895.